Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 1

Article 2

1-2007

A Theory of Expressive International Law
Alex Geisinger
Michael A. Stein

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Alex Geisinger and Michael A. Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 75 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol60/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by
an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

A Theory of Expressive
International Law
Alex Geisinger
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Ever since Grotius first suggested that desire for esteem from
the broader global community motivates States to comply with
internationallaw, identifying just how this desire effects compliance
has proven illusive. The ability to harness the pull of international
society is important to virtually all treaty formation and compliance.
It is especially important in the area of human rights regimes where
other compliance forces such as coercion, are rarely, if ever, used.
Recent empirical evidence, however, suggests that human
rights regimes are ineffective. Indeed, in many situations this
evidence suggests that the human rights practices of States that
ratify such treaties may actually worsen after ratification. The need
to understand how, or whether, the pull of international society
influences state behavior, thus, has never been greater.
This Article provides an initial detailed model of the forces
motivating human rights treaty creation and compliance by drawing
on evolving expressive law literature. It begins by setting forth a
need-reinforcement model that explains how normative pressure
influences rational actors to alter their behavior and beliefs while
seeking regard from other group members. Next, the Article applies
this model to State treaty ratificationand compliance, and describes
how treaties exert expressive effects that lead rational States to
change their behavior because of their desire to be part of and
esteemed by the global community. The Article then demonstrates
how this expressive theory harmonizes the contributions of divergent
internationallaw scholars into a more complete theory of why States
enter into and obey international law. In doing so, it provides a
framework from which regime design implications can be drawn.
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INTRODUCTION

What is the "pull of international society" and how does it
influence the willingness of States to enter into or comply with
international law? Since Grotius first identified the concept that
States seek esteem from the broader global community,1 its
parameters have proven illusive. 2 Nonetheless, the notion remains
central to discussions of why States comply with international
3
agreements.
Understanding the reputational mechanism that impels State
compliance is especially important to human rights treaties. Unlike
other regimes, States that ratify and abide by the terms of these
4
instruments receive neither reciprocal nor immediate benefits.
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1.
See generally HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A. C. Campbell, trans.,
reprint ed., M. Walter Dunne 1979) (1625); see also ABRAM CHAYES & ANOTINA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS

27-28 (1995) (arguing that compliance derives from the need to maintain one's status within a
highly interrelated community of States).
2.
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975,
977 (2005) (referencing Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks as stating that "the mechanisms of
social influence have so far been grossly underspecified in the literature") [hereinafter Koh,
Internalization].
3.
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2646 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations] (explaining that international norm
internalization occurs when a transnational actor provokes an interaction with another actor,
forcing an interpretation of the applicable global norm in order to coerce the other party to
internalize the new interpretation of the norm); see also George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones,
Reputation, Compliance, and InternationalLaw, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 95 (2002) ("International
relations theorists and international lawyers have argued that reputational concerns help ensure
that states maintain their agreements."); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of
InternationalLaw, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1835-36 (2002) (arguing that nations internalize norms
to participate in the transnational legal process).
4.
This is because human rights treaties control state conduct towards their own citizens.
See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (2003)
(stating that parties to human rights treaties "receive only promises from other nations to
refrain from harming their own citizens"). One could argue that positive network externalities,
even to the extent of financial advantage, can be generated by human rights treaty collaboration.
Such an assertion would be in line with our theory that improved reputation effects motivate
international cooperation. That impact, however, is not immediate since it requires time to
accrete. To the extent that monetary advantage is immediate, for example one state reworking
its trade relationship with another in return for the latter ratifying a given treaty, that influence
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Consequently, the desire for international esteem is the crucible by
which compliance with human rights norms is determined. Professor
Oona Hathaway has recently raised concerns about the efficacy of the
reputational mechanism through an empirical study suggesting that
ratification of human rights treaties may lead to increased human
rights violations. 5 While these findings have been challenged on both
econometric and normative grounds, 6 the need to understand whether
Hathaway's findings are simply the result of faulty measurement,
improper regime design, or the inability of social forces to compel
compliance is crucial to the development and success of the
international human rights project. Answers to these questions begin
with the development of more detailed models of the way social forces
work. Not only will such models enable us to determine if social forces
can be harnessed to better ensure compliance with human rights
treaties, they also provide a framework that can help us better design
human rights instruments.
A number of scholars have begun to explore the social
mechanism. Professors Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, for example,
suggest that the social force is one of acculturation-a process
whereby actors adopt the beliefs of the surrounding culture-and that
this force stands apart from traditional notions of coercion and

is coercive. A more complete account of the difference between persuasion, reputation, and
coercion is set forth infra Part III.B.
5.
Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle:An IntegratedTheory of International
Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 526 (2005) [hereinafter Hathaway, Between Power and Principle];
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1989
(2002) [hereinafter Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties].
6.
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14
EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 171, 173 (2003) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, Measuring the Effects]. The
essence of their critique is one of timing: human rights obligations inure on State signature and
incorporation rather than on ratification. Hence, examining the period preceding implementing
domestic legislation-when States are likely to be in technical violation when measured against
ratification but not against incorporation-may skew the results. They also assert that
Hathaway does not properly account for reservations under which States can delay
implementing treaty obligations. For an empirical examination of how this type of timing
differential affects perspectives regarding human rights compliance, see Linda Camp Keith, The
United Nations InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights: Does it Make a Difference in
Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. PEACE RES. 95, 105 (1999) ("A separate analysis was conducted
in which the states that derogated from the treaty were moved into the group of non-party
states .... When this adjustment is made, the difference between states parties and non-party
states personal integrity abuse increases substantially."). See also Ryan Goodman & Derek
Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and InternationalHuman Rights Law, 54 DUKE
L.J. 621, 700 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States] (advocating the
development of an empirical approach that would integrate the mechanisms of coercion,
persuasion and acculturation to build an effective human rights regime); Ryan Goodman &
Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1785 (2003)
(arguing that universal ratification should be the first goal of treaty regimes, while achieving
enforcement should come later).
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persuasion. 7 Other commentators aver that States ratify or comply as
a way of signaling their cooperative nature to others.8 Dean Harold
Koh suggests that a complex interaction of domestic and international
processes leads to the internalization of international norms by a
State. 9 Another school of thought, championed by Dean Anne Marie
Slaughter, suggests that norms are more likely to be enforced by
liberal States than by States that do not respect the rule of law.1 0 By
contrast, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner are skeptical of
social influences. They maintain that international norms are, at best,
artifacts of the cooperation of States with stable and preexisting
preferences." 1
Each of these observations provides an interesting and
valuable lens through which to view the long-recognized but
misunderstood process of how desire for international esteem
influences compliance. However, none provides a comprehensive
framework from which specific conclusions can be drawn. Goodman
7.
Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 6, at 626-27; Goodman & Jinks,
Measuring the Effects, supra note 6, at 183 (suggesting that a sociological empiricism might be
more helpful than Hathaway's economic approach); see also Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks,
InternationalLaw and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical,and Normative Challenges, 54
DUKE L.J. 983, 991 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, International Law] (asserting that
states are influenced by acculturation); see also Jose E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE
L.J. 961, 962 (2004) (arguing that Brian Simpson's work on the European Convention of Human
Rights would provide a valuable case study to support Goodman & Jinks' acculturation theory);
Koh, Internalization, supra note 2, at 980 (suggesting that Goodman & Jinks' acculturation
theory is an "intermediate way between persuasion and coercion").
8.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 88 (2002) (quoting
Beth Simmons as arguing that governments comply with their legal commitments in order to
preserve their reputations); David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance,
97 Nw. U. L. REV. 879, 904 (2003) (suggesting that failing to ratify a treaty indicates antagonism
towards other participants); Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your Sign?-InternationalNorms,
Signals, and Compliance, 27 Mich. J. Int'l L. 695 (2006). See also, Andrew T. Guzman, The
Promise of InternationalLaw, 92 VA. L. REV. 533, 549 (2006) (asserting that states that comply
with legal rules develop reputations as cooperative actors).
9.
"[T]ransnational legal process is normative, dynamic, and constitutive... future
transactions will further internalize those norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the
process will help to reconstitute the interests and even the identities of the participants in the
process." Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2646; see also Koh, Internalization,supra note 2,
at 981 (asserting that a State's norm-internalization could be tracked "from coercion to
persuasion to internal acceptance"); Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 181, 204 (1996) (arguing that the combination of interaction between States and
internalization of norms through domestic decision-making is what causes international law to
stick).
10. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 15 (2004) (arguing that the world order
is composed of "an intricate three-dimensional web of links between disaggregated state
institutions").
11. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 9-10, 13
(2005); Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in InternationalRelations: A
Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 119 (2002) (arguing that States use
international legal and moral rhetoric while pursuing their own interests).
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and Jinks, for instance, identify a number of different processes by
which acculturation occurs but cannot identify what process will affect
State behavior in any particular situation. 12 In arguing that
internalization is the key to compliance, Koh also provides little more
than descriptive guidance of how such a process works, relying instead
on the above-stated claim that internalization results from a complex
and dynamic interaction of States. 13 Signaling theory similarly
design and
provides scant direction for effective regime
14 Likewise, liberal theorists cannot provide a full
implementation.
understanding of why democratic States are more compliant than
others. 15 The result is an important body of work that recognizes the
centrality and implications of esteem-based mechanisms on
compliance, but fails to provide a level of detail necessary to
understand or predict how the desire for esteem affects State
behavior.
This Article provides a more complete understanding of the
forces behind treaty creation and compliance by drawing on the
developing domestic expressive law literature. By expressive law, we
mean the impact that law and legal process have on individual
behavior (construed heuristically as personal or State behavior) by
affecting the social, or normative, meaning of that behavior.' 6 We

12. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, International Law, supra note 7, at 984 (agreeing with
criticisms of their theory of acculturation by Koh and Alvarez that "more fine-grained empirical
work is required to document the specific causal pathways by which law influences States").
13. Eric A. Posner, InternationalLaw and the DisaggregatedState, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
797, 800-01 (2005) (arguing that constructivist scholars such as Harold Koh and Anne-Marie
Slaughter rely heavily on the notion of internalization but have not yet developed a coherent
theory of how internalization happens).
14. In particular, existing descriptions of signaling fail to describe how nations agree on
which behaviors become signals. For a fuller discussion, see infra Part III.D.
15. See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of an Analyst, in
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 21, 36-39 (Edith Brown Weiss, ed.,

1997) (positing an intuitionalist theory that wealthier liberal states are more likely to comply
with international law than their poorer peers without explaining why this is so); Daniel E. Ho,
Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?, 5 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 647, 682 (2002) (challenging liberal theorists on normative grounds, while also
demonstrating the absence of empirically verifiable evidence); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
InternationalLaw in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 535 (1995) (theorizing that
aggregation of preferences among influential domestic actors influences liberal democracies to
comply to a greater extent than others).
16. Throughout the Article we follow the prevailing convention of referring to States as
individuals when analyzing actions that usually result from aggregate decision-making. For a
fuller account, see Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 6, at 646 ("There is
good reason to question whether states" are influenced by social forces. "After all, much of the
research suggesting the presence of this mechanism centers on the cognitive processes of
individuals.... Substantial evidence strongly suggests, on both counts, that they do."); see also
William Bradford, International Legal Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography 4 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors) (identifying a body of scholarship that regards the State as an
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model the effects of international lawmaking on the beliefs of States
and ultimately analyze how changing normative belief can influence
the expected utility of decisions to ratify and/or comply with
international law. Along the way, we also demonstrate how our model
clarifies a number of debated issues within the developing compliance
literature. 17
We draw a number of conclusions relevant to the structure of
treaty regimes from our analysis and provide a model of how
expressive influences can best be harnessed to serve the goals of
ratification and compliance. In general, commentators have
considered the influences motivating compliance too narrowly by
concentrating on the relationships surrounding the decision of
whether to ratify or obey a given individual treaty. Rather than being
atomistic, the pull of international society is animated by a needreinforcement notion that is contingent on a larger system of global
cooperation. Absent these broader socializing mechanisms, the ability
to harness norms to achieve treaty compliance will be minimal.
Finally, we describe how treaty formation may affect the willingness
of rebel States to act in contravention of international norms, thus
lessening the ability of a treaty regime to achieve its ultimate goals.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I sets forth our expressive
theory of international law. Beginning from a standard law and
economics baseline that assumes individuals act rationally to
maximize their own utility, we apply expressive law principles to
explain how normative pressure influences rational actors to alter
their behavior and beliefs while seeking esteem from other group
members. We call this the expressive model. Part II applies this
framework to State international treaty ratification and compliance. It
describes how international law may affect States' estimates of the
likelihood of being sanctioned by other States and may also affect
preferences regarding the behaviors being regulated. Part II also
considers how international law may affect domestic lawmaking, as
well as the market behavior of citizens in a country that ratifies a
particular treaty. Ultimately, we describe how normative forces may
indeed produce greater compliance in liberal States. Part III returns

abstraction without the capacity to exercise choice between alternatives and thus treats
questions of compliance as one of human agency). Because this convention does not adequately
account for the varied roles that individuals play in reaching group-based decisions, for instance
the weight given by a State to the opinions of experts or epistemic communities, we will return to
these more nuanced effects where appropriate.
17. For our previous, respective, ventures into expressive law scholarship, see Alex
Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35 (2002); Michael Ashley
Stein, Under the EmpiricalRadar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 VA. L. REV.
1151 (2004).
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to the international law literature and demonstrates how an
expressive theory harmonizes the various schools of thought into a
more comprehensive view of international law ratification and
compliance. The Article concludes by providing an example of the way
in which enforcing our theory would affect monitoring devices in an
evolving United Nations human rights treaty.
I. EXPRESSIVE THEORY

Expressive law examines law's potential for changing the social
meaning of particular behavior by altering the social cost of
undertaking that behavior. The decision to act is based on a rational
assessment of the consequences of the behavior and the certainty of
belief.18 In the context of international law and process, the needreinforcement principle adds to the basic rational choice model of
behavior by providing a basis for understanding and modeling how the
desire for esteem influences a State's assessment of the utility of
entering into and abiding by any particular legal regime.
A. The Reasoned-Action Model
Traditional law and economics literature operates from the
premise that people act rationally to maximize their own utility when
choosing among alternatively available courses of conduct. 19 Under
this framework, known as rational choice theory, law operates by
varying the cost to an individual of satisfying her preferences through
the use of exogenous sanctions. 20 For any given opportunity,
increasing the associated cost will decrease that individual's desire to
choose that opportunity; conversely, a decrease in cost will encourage
18. See generally Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586
(1998) (arguing that rational people will internalize a norm if that action will create a benefit for
them); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1001 (1995)
[hereinafter, Lessig, The Regulation] (discussing how "[s]ocial meanings are part of the benefits
and costs associated with any individual action"); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2000) (explaining that when individuals have an
interest in coordination, law can guide behavior by "influencing expectations" of how others will
act); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2025 (1996)
(advocating that "an expressive approach to law depends on an assessment of social
consequences").
19.

See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 99-

103 (8th ed. 2000) (explaining that a person will choose to make a purchase based on the utility
the person will gain from the purchase); see also MARK PERLMAN & CHARLES R. MCCANN JR.,
THE PILLARS OF ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING: FACTORS AND MARKETS 301 (2000) (describing the

market as a "model of allocative efficiency").
20. "In the vision of law that dominates economics-influenced legal theory, law imposes
sanctions to solve problems." McAdams, supra note 18, at 1650. McAdams uses this axiom as a
departure point for his version of expressive law theory.
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the individual to satisfy her desire by choosing that opportunity. 2 1 In
other words, manipulating the opportunity set available to a given
actor will alter her subsequent choices. This standard economic
account has proved a useful baseline method for modeling human
22
behavior and thereby predicting the effects of particular policies.
Expressive law seeks to understand law's potential for
changing the social meaning of particular behavior and thereby to
alter the social cost of undertaking that behavior. 23 Some authors
consider the social, or symbolic, meaning of certain legal doctrines or
decisions; others consider the impact that law may have on mediating
the social meaning of an activity. 24 What is crucial to this analysis is
the nexus between law, norms, and social meaning. When designed
appropriately, law can cause individuals to alter their own behavior
because it either induces them to change their tastes (internalization),
or it creates a fear of bearing social sanctions (second order
sanctions).25
Our expressive theory of international law is based on the
Reasoned-Action model of decision-making, which identifies two
26
factors that affect an individual's decision to undertake a behavior.
The first factor is the individual's attitude toward the behavior itself.
The second factor is the individual's beliefs about what other people
think of the behavior. The Reasoned-Action model is diagrammed in

Figure

1.27

21. For a discussion of this point made in the context of criminal activity, see Kenneth G.
Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-ShapingPolicy, 1990
DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3, 5.
22. Two Nobel laureates defend this model from the perspective that preferences are
relatively static and that studying variable taste is a futile endeavor. See George J. Stigler &
Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,67 AM. ECON. REV. 76, 76 (1977).
23. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 18, at 585-88 (describing the role of law in the development
of social norms, and socioeconomic law and economics, which seeks to inject psychological and
social factors related to wealth and race into otherwise "neutral" economic analyses); Lessig, The
Regulation, supra note 18, at 946-48 (examining the social construction of orthodoxy and its
place in the law); McAdams, supra note 18, at 1650-51 (suggesting that law may be alternatively
conceptualized for its expressive functions, as well as its traditionally acknowledged enforcement
functions); Sunstein, supra note 18, at 2024-25 (considering how legal statements might be
designed to change social norms).
24. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661,681-83 (1998).
25. The above account is synthesized and abbreviated. For a review of the development of
the field and the nuances contained therein, see Geisinger, supra note 17, at 44-55.
26. MARTIN FISHBEIN & ICEK AJZEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, INTENTION AND BEHAVIOR: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND RESEARCH 13-18 (1975).
27. For additional sources of support for the reasoned action model, see Icek Ajzen &
Martin Fishbein, Attitudinal and Normative Variables as Predictorsof Specific Behavior, 27 J.
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 41, 42 (1973) (describing a theory that predicts behavior using
both an "attitudinal" and a "normative" factor); Icek Ajzen & Martin Fishbein, The Predictionof
Behavior from Attitudinal and Normative Variables, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 466, 46667 (1970) (reporting the results of an experiment analyzing how one's intent to act can be
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As the model suggests, an individual decides whether to engage
in particular behaviors by reasoning about how (a) good or bad, and (b)
likely or unlikely, the outcomes associated with a given behavior will
be (the "behavioral attitude"). An individual will also consider the
amount and quality of social pressure to engage or not engage in that
specific behavior (the "subjective norm"). The behavioral attitude and
28
subjective norm together determine the individual's intent to act.
Thus, understanding one's attitude toward a behavior and one's belief

predicted by one's attitude and normative beliefs). For a recent overview of research in this area,
see Icek Ajzen, The Nature and Operation of Attitudes, 52 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 27, 28 (2001)
(reviewing research published between 1996 and 1999). Figure 1 is derived from RUSSELL
VEITCH & DANIEL ARKKELIN, ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVE 109 (1995).
28. See VEITCH & ARKKELIN, supra note 27, at 108-11 (explaining the theory and relating it
to environmental perception). One interesting aspect of the model is that it helps us understand
when attitude and behavior are inconsistent; that is, when one is predisposed positively toward a
behavior but still does not undertake the behavior due to subjective expectations regarding social
pressure.

86

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1:77

about the subjective norm can help to determine 29 one's desire to
30
undertake that behavior.
B. Beliefs as the Building Blocks of Attitude
While the subjective norm is defined in terms of one's beliefs
about what others think of a behavior, it is more difficult to conceive of
the concept of attitude in terms of an individual's beliefs.3 1 Attitude
toward a behavior can, however, be defined as a function of what
individuals believe about the consequences of the behavior, 32 the
certainty of their beliefs, and their evaluations (either positive or
negative) 33 of those consequences. 34 This relationship can be expressed

29. The model itself can be deceptively simple. In particular, the model conceives of the
individual in a vacuum, uninfluenced by social context. Intentions to act, of course, rely
significantly on social context. For example, an individual may have different attitudes toward
an activity based on the normative group to which she belongs. Criminals, for example, think
differently about crime than police and an individual may have a different attitude toward
pollution as a member of her business community than she does as a member of her home or
family community. For a general analysis of the influence of social context on norms, see
ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL CONTEXT: THE ROLE OF NORMS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP 2
(Deborah J. Terry & Michael A. Hogg eds., 2000).
30. Note that intending to undertake a behavior and actually acting are not always the
same. There may be physical limitations to behavior. Thus, I may desire to climb a mountain but
weather, geography or physical exhaustion may keep me from so doing. See generally Lessig, The
Regulation, supra note 18, at 955-57 (noting that physical limitations may keep us from doing
what we want).
31. See VEITCH & ARKKELIN, supra note 27, at 109. We will discuss in much greater detail
the subjective norm infra Parts II.B.1-2.
32. One potentially significant limitation on the effective use of a belief-based theory is the
fact that any behavior is associated with a virtually limitless number of beliefs, thus significantly
limiting the ability to analyze the effect law will have on attitude. However, only a relatively
small number of beliefs affect our attitude. Due to limited attention span, apprehension, and
information processing abilities, individuals can only process a small number of beliefs at any
single time. Thus, although an individual may have a large number of beliefs that, if given time,
she could recall about a particular behavior and its consequences, only a maximum of between
five and nine of these beliefs underlie her attitude. FISHBEIN & AJZEN, supra note 26, at 218.
33. Evaluation of a consequence means simply that one thinks positively or negatively
about the consequence of an action. Consider one's attitude toward wearing a seatbelt. Certain
consequences are generally positively evaluated (e.g. safety), while certain other consequences
are generally negatively evaluated (e.g. discomfort). Evaluations of consequences are formed by
standard processes of conditioning. See, e.g., id. at 277 (noting that evaluations, in the end, must
be accounted for by the process of conditioning). These processes include operant conditioning,
classical conditioning, and vicarious conditioning. See VEITCH & ARKKELIN, supra note 27, at
105-07 (defining and providing examples of types of conditioning).
34. The elements of the belief-based theory are as follows:
(1) An individual holds many beliefs about a given object; i.e., the object may
be seen as related to various attributes, such as other objects, characteristics,
goals, etc. (2) Associated with each of the attributes is an implicit evaluative
response, i.e., an attitude. (3) Through conditioning, the evaluative responses
are associated with the attitude object. (4) The conditioned evaluative
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by the equation A. = 1 biei where A is the attitude toward behavior 0; b
is the belief about 0; (i.e. the subjective certainty that 0 will result in
consequence i); e is the evaluation of the consequence; and n is the
number of beliefs.
This theory of beliefs as the basis of attitude can be correlated
with the Subjective Expected Utility theory of behavioral science.
According to this concept, "[Wihen a person has to make a behavioral
choice, he will select that alternative which has the highest subjective
expected utility," i.e., the alternative which is likely to lead to the most
favorable outcomes. This can be stated as SEU=1 SPiUi where "SPi is
the subjective probability that the choice of this alternative will lead
to some outcome i, and Ui is the utility of the outcome i." This model
can be recast in terms of beliefs about consequences. That is, SP=b
35
and U=e, or A. =I biei..
Take, as an example, a State's attitude toward administrative
detention, a procedure whereby individuals are held without being
charged or tried with criminal violations. 36 States may evaluate the
responses summate, and thus (5) on future occasions the attitude object will
elicit this summated evaluative response, i.e., the overall attitude.
FISHBEIN & AJZEN, supra note 26, at 29. The theory of belief-based attitude and intent has its
roots in the earliest work of Professor Fishbein. See, e.g., Martin Fishbein, An Investigationof the
Relationships Between Beliefs About an Object and the Attitude Toward That Object, 16 HuM.
REL. 233, 234 (1963) (positing that all beliefs about an object are related to an individual's
attitude, since all beliefs about an object contain an evaluative aspect). For a description of the
belief-based theory of attitude and intent formation, this Article will rely primarily on FISHBEIN
& AJZEN, supra note 26, which remains the most comprehensive exegesis of the theory. It should,
however, be noted that the theory has been elaborated further in a number of articlessometimes responding to criticism-by Professors Fishbein, Ajzen, and others. For examples of
criticism, see Vernon E. Cronen & Richard L. Conville, Fishbein's Conception of Belief Strength:
A Theoretical, Methodological and Experimental Critique, 42(2) SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 143, 147150 (1975) (presenting three studies that cast doubt on Fishbein's theory of attitude); Joseph R.
Priester & Monique A. Fleming, Artifact or Meaningful Theoretical Constructs?: Examining
Evidence for Nonbelief- and Belief-Based Attitude Change Processes, 6(1) J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL.
67, 69 (1997) (noting and describing the evidence for a number of nonbelief-based attitude
change processes). For further exposition and response to these criticisms, see Martin Fishbein &
Susan Middlestadt, Noncognitive Effects on Attitude Formation and Change: Fact or Artifact?,
4(2) J. OF CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 181, 184 (1995) (analyzing a number of critical studies and
arguing that the contribution of factors, other than belief-based expectancy-value measures to
the prediction of attitude, can be seen as a methodological artifact of using inappropriate
measures); see also Martin Fishbein & Susan E. Middlestadt, A Striking Lack of Evidence for
Nonbelief-Based Attitude Formation and Change: A Response to Five Commentaries, 6(1) J.
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 107, 108 (1997) (arguing that most criticism avoids assessing the beliefbased structure that underlies attitude formation).
35. FiSHBEIN & AJZEN, supra note 26, at 30-31; see also Lynn R. Anderson & Martin
Fishbein, Prediction of Attitude From the Number, Strength, and Evaluative Aspect of Beliefs
About the Attitude Object: A Comparison of Summation and Congruity Theories, 2(3) J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437 (1965) (arguing that basic summation of belief and
evaluation yields significantly better predictions of attitude than congruity theory).
36. For practical examples and further analysis, see Amnesty International's website,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/isr-action-detention (last visited Nov. 4, 2006).
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procedure both positively as providing greater protection against
terrorist activities and negatively as reducing civil liberties. The
certainty with which a State holds these beliefs, in conjunction with
its evaluations of the effects of each of these outcomes, can determine
that country's attitude regarding the behavior. To see why, assume a
scale of certainty that runs from 0 (no certainty) to +100 (strong
certainty) and a similar scale for evaluation -100 (strong dislike) to
+100 (strong like). Applying these factors to administrative detention
could have the results set forth in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Belief

Certainty

Evaluation

be

Protects against Terrorist Acts
Restricts Civil Liberties

+50
+40

+50
-40
A. Zbgei

+2500
-1600

-+900

Based on these beliefs, a State would be inclined to use administrative
detention, but not very strongly (because the utility is only +900).

C. The Need-Reinforcement Principle
The notion that States value their reputation among other
37
States is, of course, not new to discussions of international law.
Early proponents of this view discussed the "need to preserve
38
solidarity with one's fellow States as an explanation for compliance."
These scholars discussed the incentive to comply with international
law as based on prodding from other States with whom that State is

37. See, e.g., Downs & Jones, supra note 3, at 96 (arguing that states have multiple
reputations which vary in connection with different agreements, and thus, while reputation does
matter, the standard notion that states keep commitments out of concern for their reputations
may overestimate its impact); Hathaway, Between Power and Principle, supra note 5, at 494
(discussing reputation as a consideration that influences States' decisions whether to commit to
and comply with treaties); Colin B. Picker, Reputational Fallacies in International Law: A
ComparativeReview of United States and Canadian Trade Actions, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 67, 6970 (2004) ("The potential harm of reputation derives from the fact that state reputation is an
important and vital component in the smooth operation of international law. With few
traditional legal mechanisms to ensure that states comply with international law, it is arguable
that reputation is an important, even crucial, mechanism for securing state compliance.").
38. Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2613 (internal citations omitted); see also
Nathaniel Berman, The Paradoxes of Legitimacy: Case Studies in International Legal
Modernism, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 583, 585 (1991) (describing Alfred Verdross's theory that
obligation in international law must be grounded in a basic norm, which is "the fundamental rule
whose function is to institute the supreme creative authority of law").
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engaged. 39 Others still suggested that States shared a "common
consciousness" that led them to comply with international law because
''particular rules are nested within a much broader fabric of ongoing
40
communal relations."
More recently, international relations theorists have focused on
interdependence as the underlying mechanism through which
reputational factors affect state action. 4 1 These theorists view
international law as reflecting the strategies engaged in by States
involved in long-term relationships to increase their esteem within the
global community. 42 Social norms and the rules that embody them,
they assume, influence the strategies pursued by States within these
games. 43 Our expressive theory builds on and bridges some of these
understandings. It provides a definite understanding of the forces that
lead to the pull of international society that many scholars have
identified as a key to compliance. Further, it bases the desire for
reputational benefits in a preference for esteem that develops from
beneficial interaction with other members of a group.
Most law and economics scholars conceive of norms as arising
from cooperation problems that confront rational individuals acting in
their own self-interest. 44 A classic example of a cooperation problem is
39. See Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2613 ("[Tlhe interwar years modified the
process-based strand of thinking about the compliance question by mixing process with
reputation: the 'solidaristic' strand that emerged derived a nation's incentive to obey from the
encouragement and prodding of other nations with whom it is engaged in a managerial,
discursive legal process." (emphasis in original)).
40. Id. at 2617 (arguing that English scholars developed the notion of a "common
consciousness" in invoking the Grotian notion of "international society," within which nations
comply for communitarian reasons).
41. SLAUGHTER, supra note 10, at 170 (noting that government networks "could develop and
support the implementation of 'network norms' that would strengthen the integrity and
competence of all their members"). As explained by Koh, "scholars began to look as well at
transnational networks among nonstate actors, international institutions, and domestic political
structures as important mediating forces in international society .....They understood
compliance with international law to result almost entirely from the functional benefits such
compliance provides." Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2624-25.
42. See, e.g., Downs & Jones, supra note 3, at S96 (averring that the reputational
consequences of defection require States to engage in a complex cost-benefit analysis when
deciding whether to comply with their obligations); Anne E. Sartori, The Might of the Pen: A
Reputational Theory of Communication in InternationalDisputes, 56 INT'L ORG. 121, 123 (2002)
(noting that States behave with a view to how the reputations they engender will impact future
and repeated transactions).
43. See generally Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A
Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143, 167 (2001) (extrapolating
game theory to international legal regimes).
44. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatismand the Law and Economics Movement,
84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2126 n.235 (1996) (noting that individuals may be hesitant to act in an
altruistic fashion unless there is some assurance that others will be compelled to act in a similar
fashion); Steven A. Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dangerous World, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 7 n.21 (1999) (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L.
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the "prisoner's dilemma," which posits two rational, self-interested
individuals who must choose between alternate strategies. In the
circumstance of the game, pursuit of individual self interest leads to
worse results for each individual than if he or she had cooperated with
45
the other.
Take, for example, the following scenario between prisoners
Row and Column, who have been placed in separate cells at the police
station and are being questioned. If one inmate tells on the other, the
tattler will be let off for cooperation, and the other detainee will get a
three-year sentence. If neither tells, each will be found guilty of a
lesser offense and serve one year in prison. If both tell, each will be
convicted of a more significant offense and incarcerated for two years.
The options and consequences can be diagrammed as follows.
Figure 3

Cooperate (withhold)
Defect (tell)

Cooperate
(withhold)
1/1
0/3

Defect
(tell)
3/0
2/2

Given these circumstances, Row will always tell. Here's why:
Assume first that Column does tell. If Row fails to do likewise, he will
get three years in jail; if he does tell, he will receive only a two-year
sentence. Now assume that Column does not tell. Row will not be
imprisoned if he tells, but he will be punished with one year in jail if
REV. 903, 918 (1996) ("Good social norms solve collective action problems by encouraging people
to do useful things that they would not do without the relevant norms."); Steven A. Hetcher,
Norm Proselytizers Create a Privacy Entitlement in Cyberspace, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877,
902-03 n.90 (2001) (describing four alternative accounts of how norms may serve as solutions to
iterated collective action problems); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in
Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765, 797 (1998) ("[T]he social norm describes the
behavior that arises in equilibrium. It is not that X punishes Y for violating a social norm;
rather, X (and many other people) avoids Y because Y's behavior reveals to X that association
with Y will not serve X's interests."); Elmer J. Schaefer, PredictingDefection, 36 U. RICH. L. REV.
443, 462 (2002) (discussing social norms, specifically signaling, as an answer to defections in
prisoner's dilemma problems with cooperation theories).
45. The most successful strategy is the well-known "tit-for-tat" strategy that emerged
victorious from a number of computer tournaments run by Robert Axelrod. Following the
tournaments, Axelrod simulated natural selection with sixty-three programs by adjusting the
number of offspring produced in each successive round based on a strategy's performance in the
previous round. After one thousand rounds of play, weak programs became extinct, and so did
some predatory programs that had survived by exploiting dwindling programs lower in the food
chain. Interestingly, in this game, which was designed to simulate Darwinian natural selection,
TFT won again, just as it had in Axelrod's tournaments. See generally David Crump, Game
Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331, 377-78
(2001).
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he remains silent. In these circumstances, it is better for the selfinterested Row to tell regardless of what Column does. The dominant
strategy for both players will therefore be to tell, resulting in each
getting locked up for two years. By contrast, if neither tells, each gets
only one year in jail. Consequently, the pursuit of individual selfinterest by Row and Column leads to worse results than if they had
cooperated and both withheld information.
While defection is the dominant strategy in a one-time play of
the prisoner's dilemma, cooperation is a natural result of such a
problem in situations where the parties will play the game a
substantial number of times. 46 Let us assume that Column and Row
are now, respectively, a wholesaler and retailer of goods. They want to
create a relationship whereby Column will supply the goods at a
certain cost. If Column delivers the quality of goods agreed upon, both
parties will make two. If Column cheats and sends goods of lesser
quality he will make three and Row will make zero, but Row will end
their relationship and Column will have to look for other cooperative
partners. A similar result would occur if Row cheats, for example, by
challenging the quality of the goods and withholding full payment.
Assuming a desire to play for a number of times, it is better for the
parties to cooperate than to sever their ties. This is because making
two regularly is better than making three a few times while also
developing a reputation for being untrustworthy and so losing future
cooperative opportunities. As Professor Eric Posner has pointed out,
"logic shows that the optimal move is always to cooperate. '' 47 Norms
are, in turn, artifacts of the long-term cooperation of these rational
individuals.
The game-theoretic model of norm formation is, of course,
extremely parsimonious. In particular, it does little to help us identify
specifically the way in which individual beliefs or preferences can be
linked to the behavioral standards embodied by norms. Nor does the
model provide an understanding of why individuals comply with
norms. We will use the concept of need reinforcement in conjunction
with the basic social psychology of norms and groups to inform the
rational choice model, and in particular provide an understanding of
these issues. By identifying norms as reflections of aggregate
preference and normative behavior as a signal of the importance of
group standing to an individual, the model provides a framework for
46. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 19 (Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (developing the
foundation for a theory of norms as signals of one's cooperativeness).
47. Id. at 16. Posner also suggests that the logic of cooperation extends to games involving
more than two players by assuming that everyone has sufficient information about other people's
past activities. Id. Thus, defection from one pairwise transaction will not lead to a "clean slate" in
the next pairwise transaction. Id.
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considering how estimations of group preference may inform and
effect behavior.
The sociological model leads to a particular view of groups and
norms. Pursuant to the rational choice perspective, groups form when
individuals come together for the mutual satisfaction of their own
needs. 48 The individual is the basic unit of such a conception of the
group, 49 and interdependence is the force that holds these individuals
together.50 In this sense, the group is simply a reflection, or
aggregation, of the individuals that comprise it, and the idea of a
group as something other than a collection of individuals is
meaningless. 51 The idea of a social norm within this framework is, in
turn, simply the reflection of the aggregate preferences of the
individuals that comprise the group. 52 That is, norms are the
reflection of the perceived majority position of any group of individuals
and can be determined by simply combining the individual positions of
53
the majority of group members.
It is difficult, however, to reconcile this view of normative
behavioral standards with the notion that normative behavior
provides information on one's willingness to cooperate with other
group members. The connection between certain moral norms, such as
"do unto others as they would do unto you," and one's cooperativeness,
is apparent. It becomes harder, however, to see the relationship
between other norms-for instance eating hot dogs at a baseball
54
game-and one's cooperative nature.

48.

See, e.g.,

MUZAFER

SHERIF, GROUP

CONFLICT AND

COOPERATION:

THEIR SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGY 64-69 (1966) (illustrating how shared identity and group organization arise as
derivative phenomena from interdependence between group members).
49. This concept has its roots in some of the earliest work of social psychology. As early as
1924, psychologists argued that the individual was the only psychological reality and that there
was nothing in the group that was not in the individual. FLOYD HENRY ALLPORT, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 4 (The Riverside Press 1924) ('There is no psychology of groups which is not
essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals.").
50. John C. Turner, Social Categorizationand the Self-Concept: A Social Cognitive Theory
of Group Behavior, 2 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 77, 79 (1985).
51. See ALLPORT, supra note 49, at 4 (arguing that the individual is the only psychological
reality and that there is nothing in the group that is not in the individual).
52. See Turner, supra note 50, at 79 (discussing how groups are defined in terms of shared
values that prescribe beliefs, attitudes and conduct).
53. Id. at 82 (observing that various theories of social influence have been characterized by
individualism, as evidenced by the assumption that the social norm is assumed to be exactly the
sum of its parts).
54. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms and Economic
Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 676-78 (2001) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS, supra note 46) [hereinafter McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates]. He asserts that it
would be inefficient for all of these behaviors to act as signals of cooperativeness. Instead, he
suggests, the most efficient way to create a reputation for cooperativeness is, simply, to cooperate
with others.
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Posner has attempted to solve this problem by describing
norms as behavioral equilibria that result from people signaling their
discount rates to one another. 55 He suggests that preferences
regarding the value of future payoffs differ among the population.
Thus, people with low discount rates are less likely to defect from a
cooperation game because they value future payoffs higher than most.
Posner deems such people "good types."5 6 In order to distinguish
themselves from bad types, good types engage in behaviors that signal
their higher discount rates. Because they value future payoffs more
highly, good types are willing to undertake more expensive signaling
behaviors. Norms, to Posner, are the behavioral equilibria that result
from good and bad types signaling their discount rates.5 7 While
Posner's effort continues to be the most comprehensive attempt to
explain norm formation, and, in particular, to explain the normative
basis for a number of specific behaviors, it has been subject to
criticism. 58 We discuss below one major criticism concerning the
inability of the theory to explain how States choose which behaviors do
59
and do not act as signals.
The social-psychological model provides a simpler explanation
of how norms reflect a State's cooperativeness. This explanation is
rooted in the mutual attraction that arises between States that are
interdependent. This attraction is rooted in the operation of a need
satisfaction or "reinforcement" principle: mutual liking between group
members reflects the extent to which positive, gratifying or rewarding
outcomes are associated directly or indirectly with being in a
cooperative relationship with each other.6 0 The greater the perceived
rewards of group membership, the greater the attraction to the group,
and the less likelihood of defection.
55. POSNER, supra note 46, at 19-23.
56. Id. at 18-19 (noting that a good type is more likely to cooperate in a repeated prisoner's
dilemma than a bad type is, because the good type cares more about the future payoffs that are
lost if cooperation fails).
57. Id. at 18-22 (finding the origin of the variation of social norms across time and place in
the struggle by good types to differentiate themselves from bad types via signaling).
58. See, e.g., Steven A. Hetcher, Commentaries on Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms:
Cyberian Signals, 36 U. RICH. L. REV 327, 359 (2002) ("Posner errs, then, by using signaling of
discount rates as the sole explanation for norms."); Dan M. Kahan, Commentaries on Eric
Posner's Law and Social Norms: Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law
and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 371 (2002) ("Posner's signaling model, as it
stands ... should not be trusted to guide public policy even provisionally for four distinct
reasons." (emphasis in original)); see also McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates, supra note 54, at
627 (stating that Posner's discount-rate signaling theory of social norms exaggerates the
importance of the motivation and mechanisms it employs and understates the importance of the
normative origins of norms).
59. See infra Part III.D.
60. Turner, supra note 50, at 79.
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Normative pressure is, in turn, an external force that affects a
State's behavior only to the extent it is concerned about other States
to which it is attracted. 61 Put simply, if a State wants to do something
it perceives is not condoned by other group members, and there is a
sense of mutual liking or attraction between that State and the other
group members, the State risks disapproval from others to which it is
attracted. 62 A group member who seeks esteem is thus required to
estimate which behaviors are approved by other group members. The
more uniformly held and highly valued the preference, the more likely
it will assert normative force.
Let us return to the example of administrative detention and a
given State's belief about group preferences regarding this behavior.
Consider two different possible levels of belief regarding the norm. In
one case, imagine that the State believes that ninety percent of the
group does not condone administrative detention (in which case that
State's utilization of detention will offend nine out of ten group
members), and in the other it believes only sixty percent of the group
does not condone administrative detention (i.e., that the procedure
will only offend six of ten group members). Depending on its own
beliefs regarding administrative detention, this difference may have
an impact on the State's willingness to undertake the practice.
These differences can be measured in terms of their impacts on
expected utility. Recall that the State may evaluate the procedure
both positively as providing greater protection against terrorist
activities, and also negatively as reducing civil liberties. Assume that
only these two beliefs, along with a belief regarding the subjective
norm, are relevant to the behavior. Assume further that beliefs about
the behavior are held constant-our State prefers the use of
administrative detention but does not hold this preference very
strongly (as set forth above, +900 units). The certainty with which it
holds beliefs about the norm will thus determine the State's attitude
regarding the behavior. Consider the effect on utility in the situation
when certainty of belief regarding the subjective norm drops from
ninety-five to thirty, as set forth in Figures 4 and 5:

61. Rational choice scholars intuitively understand this attraction. See, e.g., Robert Cooter,
Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV.
1577, 1592-93 (2000) ("Business, politics, love, and war cause people to form relationships with
each other. These relationships create opportunities for mutual benefit from cooperation and also
opportunities for people to exploit each other.").
62.

JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-CATEGORIZATION

THEORY 20 (Basil Blackwell Inc. 1987) ("[Wlhere people perceive, believe or expect to achieve
mutual satisfaction from their association, they will tend to associate in a solitary fashion, to
develop positive interpersonal attitudes and to influence each other's attitudes and behaviour on
the basis of their power to satisfy needs for information and reward each other.").
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Figure 4
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Figure 5
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Because the State's understanding of the uniformity with
which a belief is helil (+30 versus +95) impacts its estimation of
normative sanction, the State will feel constrained to act by normative
control in the latter case (because the utility is -50) and not
constrained in the former (where the utility remains positive, +600).
Now, consider that our group member values group
membership much more strongly. For example, contrast the situation
of an emerging democracy with that of an established democratic
regime. To the nascent State, approbation from and inclusion in the
broader global community may be valued as more crucial to its
international standing than would be the case for an accepted group
member. 63 Thus, its negative evaluation of the normative
consequences of acting out of step with group attitudes will be much
more substantial (we assume an evaluation for this example of -50).

63. We recognize that other factors will also play a significant role in this process. For
example, the anchoring and framing heuristics may significantly impact estimations of a nation's
perception of the group norm. A nation that has, for many years, shown a strong proclivity for
group membership, but that violates norms a few times, may thus do so with a certain amount of
immunity. Continued violation, however, may clearly signal a change in the importance of group
membership to the nation. See Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient? Pluralistic Ignorance,
Heuristics, and the Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1, 19-24 (2005)
(describing how heuristics may influence norm perception generally).
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This evaluation will result in conformity regarding a much larger
number of behaviors, as illustrated in Figure 6:
Figure 6
Belief

Certainty

Evaluation

be

Will result in Sanction
Protects against Terrorist

+30
+50

-50
+50

-1500
+2500

Restricts Civil Liberties

+40

-40
A. =E b i ei

-1600
= -600

Acts

In such a case, even a small perceived certainty (+30) of sanction will
result in conformity.
The more a State conforms to perceived group norms, the more
likely other group members are to perceive that State to be strongly
attracted to the group. The willingness of the above-mentioned
emerging State to abide by international norms reflects its deep value
of acceptance by the global community. This is particularly the case
when States exhibit group conformity with less certain norms that are
not universally held. This commitment to group membership acts as a
strong signal of the emerging State's unwillingness to defect from
cooperative endeavors with other group members.
The need-reinforcement addition to the basic rational choice
model of behavior thus establishes a very particular view of groups
and norm formation with the rational individual at its core. Norms
arise only because rational individuals attain benefits from interacting
with others and thus develop a free standing desire for others'
acceptance. Individuals attempt to determine the preferences of the
majority, and failure to act in accordance with the view of others
negatively impacts one's perceived attractiveness to other group
members. The higher one values group membership, the less likely
one is to defect from cooperative endeavors.
The need-reinforcement principle provides a basis for including
in the model of expressive effects of law a separate preference for
esteem from others. The Reasoned-Action model describes this desire
for esteem as the subjective norm. The desire for esteem will join other
preferences that underlie a State's attitude to determine the utility of
any particular regulated behavior. Such an understanding of norms
allows us to model how international law and process may affect
decisions regarding the utility of entering into and abiding by a
particular legal regime.
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II. AN EXPRESSIVE MODEL OF RATIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE
According to the expressive model, international legal process
can affect a State's understanding of the social norm through two
distinct pathways. First, international process can change other
States' preferences by providing information on objective reality. As
the preferences of a number of States change, so too may norms and/or
norm certainty. In cases where preferences change enough, a new
norm may develop and become entrenched. Second, international
process may directly communicate information on existing aggregate
preference. That is, when normative belief is uncertain or not yet
developed, international process can provide information on the beliefs
of other States that will permit a State to develop its own
understanding of the aggregate preferences of others. In such a case,
norms haven't changed but certainty regarding the norm has.
A. InternationalProcesses
Under the expressive model, international law and process are
seen as means of attempting to change behavior by changing beliefs
either about objective reality or about the subjective norm.
Ratification of a treaty also impacts a number of beliefs about norms
and thus also affects compliance. Let us consider each in order, using
examples that isolate each of the different forces at work. We will
start with the case of global warming.6 4 The first element of the
expressive model suggests that one way to change a State's desires
regarding the regulation of the causes of global warming or
compliance with a global warming treaty is simply to update its belief
of objective reality. Consider the way in which over time science has
changed estimations of the likelihood that global warming, with its
attendant negative consequences, is occurring as the result of humanmade changes to the natural environment. At some point, the
certainty of harm will increase until it overcomes any reservations
about ratifying or complying with a treaty. Take as an example a
model of a State with only three salient beliefs regarding compliance
with a global warming treaty. Figure 7 illustrates the salient beliefs
held by that State during a period of early science in which there is
little certainty that human-made materials change global climate.
64. As we will discuss infra, compliance with human rights treaties results primarily from
the impact of international law on the subjective norm. However, international law may
influence compliance through other expressive forces, such as by changing perceptions of
objective reality that, in turn, change preferences for regulation. We turn to the example of
environmental treaties in these sections to illustrate a variety of these expressive forces
specifically because human rights treaties alone cannot be used to do so.
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Figure 8 illustrates the salient beliefs held by that State during a
period of later science when there is greater certainty that humanmade materials change global climate.
Figure 7
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Figure 8
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Under this model, changing belief about objective reality results in a
changed attitude toward regulation or compliance.
Of course, changing attitudinal belief can also change beliefs
regarding the subjective norm. Norms, under our theory, simply
reflect the aggregated preferences of members of the group of States to
which that State belongs. As changes in understandings of objective
reality result in increased preference for regulation of global warming,
this in turn changes estimations of the likelihood of being sanctioned
for failing to abide by the preferences of the majority of group
members. At some point, the changed perception of group preference
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will reach a tipping point and a new, pro-regulation norm will become
entrenched.
International process may also provide information that is
directly relevant to the subjective norm. Take as an example a newly
formed Islamic democracy. Assume that this country's culture
historically did not value women's social and political participation at
a level equivalent to the beliefs currently held by the majority of
democratic States. When considering whether to ratify the already
existing Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women ("CEDAW'), 65 the Islamic democracy will infer from
the CEDAW's existence a prevailing norm that favors women's
equality. 66 To the extent that the Islamic democracy values
membership in the global community of democratic States, it will feel
increased pressure to ratify the CEDAW as a way to avoid social
sanction. In this manner, the existence of treaties or other
international regimes can inform directly the subjective norm.
Context plays a significant role in the way that ratification
information,
on scientific
dependence
their
occurs. Given
environmental treaties may be influenced to a large degree by changes
in objective reality, like recognition that global warming is the result
of man-made emissions. Trade regimes may be more dependent on
reciprocal benefits or coercion, for example, conditioning a State's
trade status on membership in the World Trade Organization or on its
agreement not to counterfeit goods. Human rights regimes, on the
other hand-which in the main are neither reciprocal nor influenced
by changing scientific understandings-are relatively more dependent
on direct normative influence; in other words, States ratify the
CEDAW because of a general desire to be members of the
international community rather than new information about the
biological realities of women.
B. The Interactionof Internationaland Domestic Processes
An important issue in the developing compliance literature
concerns how ratification of a treaty may influence domestic

65.

G.A. Res. 34/180, at 193, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Sept.

3, 1981).

66. An additional factor that may impact normative belief is the CEDAW's embodiment of a
more universally held norm of equality. To the extent that a State believes equality to be a
universally held norm, it will expect a large number of nations to be willing to enforce it. See
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Social Norms, 96 U. MICH. L.
REV. 338 (1997) [hereinafter McAdams, The Origin].
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lawmakers to regulate behavior. 67 That is, once a treaty has been
ratified by a State, why and when does the State choose to conform to
the treaty's terms? A simple answer is that States that ratify treaties
have obligations to abide by them. This notion motivates claims that
liberal States-that is, States that believe in the rule of law-are more
likely to abide by their legal obligations than others. 68 However, this
response does not address the more indirect way in which treaty
ratification may permeate the "consciousness" of a State so as to affect
everything from judicial decision making to domestic regulation and
even the behavior of individual citizens. A developing body of
international law scholarship asks the important question of how
international norms may affect domestic understanding of an issue.
This Section provides a more detailed analysis of how this mechanism
69
works.
Ratification of a treaty may influence domestic norms, which in
turn can affect both citizen behavior and domestic policy. By
demonstrating how ratification affects norms and preference, the
expressive theory provides an understanding of the mechanisms by
which this happens. Generally, ratification of a treaty may provide
information on the aggregate preference of the majority in a liberal
state where acts of the State's representatives (in this case the
ratification of a treaty) are sometimes presumed to reflect the will of
the majority.7 0 To the extent this is the case, a treaty represents the

67. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, Measuring the Effects, supra note 6, at 173 ("[T]he
incorporation of human rights norms [into domestic law] is a process; treaty law plays an
important role in this process."); Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 1938-39
(discussing how "treaties play an important constraining role" in domestic law). The focus on
domestic politics' influence on compliance is often associated with the liberalist view. For an
excellent discussion, see Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 1952-55.
68. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, InternationalRelations Theory, International Law, and
the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 361, 366 (1999)
("[S]cholars are exploring whether liberal democratic states-with representative institutions
and a commitment to the rule of law-are more amenable to legal relationships and arguments
and more prone to comply with legal rules than states with different domestic regimes."); Anne
Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalismand the Act of State Doctrine,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1920-21 (1992) (arguing that liberal States are more likely to act within
the "zone of law" than others).
69. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the
Rationalist-ConstructivistDivide, 3 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 473, 474 (1997) (noting that the domestic
effect of international norms is to sometimes constrain and sometimes constitute); Andrew P.
Cortell & James W. Davis, Jr., Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A
Research Agenda, 2 INT'L STUD. REV. 65, 86 (2000) ("[The effects of an international norm cannot
be understood independent of the norm's salience in the domestic political discourse.").
70. See also Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86
VA. L. REV. 1603, 1647 (2000) (incorporating endogenous preference derived from social norms
into rational choice theory). See generally Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of
Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000) [hereinafter McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory]
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will of the electorate, and individuals will update their beliefs
regarding majority preference accordingly. Ratification of a treaty may
also inform individual preference which, in turn, further changes
estimations of normative belief. As normative belief becomes more
congruous with the treaty that was ratified, failure to abide by it will
more likely result in social sanctions for individual behaviors contrary
to the treaty's goals. In these ways, the certainty of social sanction for
failure to abide by a norm of the international community becomes
greater with the ratification of a treaty. To the extent that domestic
policy in liberal States reflects the will of the public, changes in
perceptions of majority preference will also influence domestic law
making. Moreover, changed understanding of objective reality may
also influence judicial decision making.
The following Subsections analyze how ratification affects
normative belief and forces of domestic compliance. The first Subsection considers how ratification may directly impact the subjective
norm of the ratifying State's citizens. Once we have demonstrated how
ratification affects belief, we will discuss how and when changed belief
translates into different market behavior and domestic regulation.
The second Subsection considers indirect influences of ratification on
the subjective norm.
1. Direct Influences on the Subjective Norm
There are a number of ways in which ratification can directly
influence the subjective norms of citizens in a State that has ratified a
treaty. Primary mechanisms again include providing information that
changes individual preference, which may ultimately affect
perceptions of majority belief, and providing information that leads
one to infer an increased likelihood that the international norm will be
socially enforced at a domestic level. We will examine each of these
possibilities, starting with the latter.
Ratification of a treaty can provide information on what the
majority of a State believes and thus serve to change or reinforce what
citizens will sanction socially and, in the case of some democratic
regimes, affect politicians' willingness to act. The mechanism by which
ratification influences normative belief will be particularly influential
in cases where there is great uncertainty regarding aggregate
preference or objective reality. Let us consider the historical example
of perceptions of ozone depletion in the United States up to and after

(presenting a theory that law changes behavior by signaling the underlying attitudes of a
community).
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ratification of the Montreal Protocol.7 1 In 1986 great uncertainty still
72
existed regarding the effects of human-made emissions on ozone.
America's ratification of the treaty, however, served as a coalescing
moment that mobilized the population to act in support of the treaty's
goals.73 Indeed, just weeks after the United States ratified the
Montreal Protocol, many communities began to ban products made
with ozone depleting chemicals, "giving American industry a clear
74
indication of the public mood."
Expressive theory provides a means for describing this
'ratification effect." Treaty ratification may change beliefs through a
number of different inferential mechanisms. First, in States where
treaties are subject to the approval of politically accountable branches
before they can be ratified, ratification can carry with it information
that a treaty's standards reflect the will of the majority. A person who
is unsure of current majority preference but who believes that treaties
will be ratified only when the majority approves of their standards
will update his or her belief regarding the preferences of the majority
75
as a result of ratification.
The United States's ratification of the Montreal Protocol also
provided a basis for an individual to increase his or her certainty of
objective reality (in this case that ozone depletion is a significant
problem) and affect preferences for regulation. The inferential process
is similar to the one discussed earlier regarding how the willingness of
other States to ratify may affect an individual State's belief. If one
believes his or her State is generally unwilling to regulate behaviors
subject to a treaty, but the State ratifies in any case, one may infer
71. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
1522 U.N.T.S. 3, was ratified by the United States on April 21, 1988, and came into force on
January 1, 1989.
72.

See RICHARD BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING THE

PLANET 15 (Harvard Univ. Press 1998) (stating that "great uncertainties still remained" in 1986
in understanding the science of ozone).
73. See id. at 315 (describing how government efforts to inform their constituents about
treaty obligations influenced politicians and private entities to act responsibly for the
environment).
74. Id. at 102.
75. There is a concern regarding this mechanism. Many citizens simply do not believe that
ratification correlates with majority beliefs. Public choice theory in particular suggests that
special interest groups capture legislatures and thus that legislative acts do not reflect popular
attitudes. Individuals that believe this to be the way legislation is created will not infer that
legislation reflects the will of the majority. McAdams responds to this concern by suggesting that
there are "weak" and "strong" forms of public interest theory and that, in some cases, inferences
of majority influence on decision-making are still possible. See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory,
supra note 70, at 330-31. As our expressive theory clarifies, the strong or weak version of public
choice theory is relevant to the effect of ratification on the subjective norm to the extent they are
preexisting beliefs held by individuals. The weaker the belief in public choice theory, the more
likely an individual is to believe that law correlates with majority opinion.
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from ratification that the problem was worse than originally
contemplated. 76 Indeed, ratification may well have provided the main
impetus for a change in preferences, and ultimately norms, in the
United States. As individuals inferred from United States ratification
that the problem of ozone emissions was "real" or greater than they
previously believed, they adjusted their preferences for regulation
accordingly. As more individuals changed from a preference for no
regulation to a preference for regulation, a tipping point was reached
and a new norm entrenched.
We should note that our focus is on the effects of ratification on
norms. This should not be taken to suggest that other elements of
international lawmaking cannot affect normative belief. In the case of
ozone, United States-led efforts mobilized much of the scientific
community to create the evidence needed to link soundly CFCs to
ozone depletion. The science alone, in cases where there is not
competing science, could very well affect the preferences of those who
learn of it through newspaper articles or other sources. The impact of
international process on belief should not be underestimated.
However, as the effect of the Montreal Protocol suggests, ratification
itself is an important and distinct influence on domestic regulation
and behavior.
We have established up to this point that treaty ratification
can influence individual preferences, as well as beliefs about the
preferences of others. Both of these forces affect the decisions of
individuals within the marketplace. In the case of ozone, information
linking CFCs to things such as Styrofoam food packaging and aerosol
spray cans changed people's preferences regarding the types of
products they chose to use. As more people changed preferences
regarding products, a norm in favor of products made without CFCs
became entrenched, adding pressure to those who still preferred CFCproduced products to change their behavior or face social sanction.
This substantially decreased demand for such products and cleared
77
the way for new CFC-free technology.
A change in norms would also likely affect the willingness of
regulators to pass laws controlling the use of CFCs-at least when
regulators see themselves as accountable to the populace. This, of
course, highlights again the reasons why liberal regimes may be more
greatly influenced by international process than others. Not only are
76. See Richard McAdams & Dhammika Dharmapla, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and the
Expressive Function of Law: A Theory of Informative Law, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2003).
77. See BENEDICK, supra note 72, at 104-05 (describing how ratification of the Montreal
Protocol led to consumer pressure which in turn led to phase out of CFC products such as spray
cans in England); see also id. at 310-11 (describing the "decisive" effects of consumer pressure on
phase outs of products made with CFCs in England, Taiwan and Germany).
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individuals in a liberal state more likely to believe that law reflects
majority preferences and thus update their own normative belief, but
politicians are also more likely to care about majority belief when they
choose to regulate. Totalitarian and other non-democratic regimes feel
less pressure from a change in citizen perceptions. This is not to
suggest that what citizens perceive to be important has no impact in
such regimes; the effects on citizens described above may also
influence leaders. Similarly, to the extent that international process
may affect preference and not just normative belief, the governing
members of society may change their preferences regarding the need
for regulation. Where the influence of citizen concern is omitted,
however (such as in non-liberal regimes), the ability of ratification and
process to effect change will decrease. The key to compliance in such
cases is not the domestic impact on the citizenry, but the impact on
government officials' preferences and their concern about the esteem
from other members of international society.
Finally, we must consider how changing perceptions also
influence judicial decision making through these mechanisms. A clear
example is United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the death
penalty, determining the extent to which this punishment is "cruel
and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment. 78 To make this
assessment, the Justices reference "evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." 79 Abolishing the death
penalty for convicted felons under the age of sixteen as offensive to
"civilized standards of decency" in 1988, the Court noted that its
conclusion was "consistent with the views that have been expressed by
respected professional organizations, by other States that share our
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western
European community."8 0 The following year the Court held that
executing the mentally retarded could not categorically be said to
violate either the Eighth Amendment or national norms.8 1 However,
because of the consistent American state movement away from this
practice, as well as its almost complete absence internationally, in
2002 the Court banned those executions.8 2 Last year the Court further
proscribed the death penalty by prohibiting executions of juveniles
under the age of eighteen, relying heavily on the "relevance of the
views of the international community."8 3 Among the evidence cited
78. For international parallels, see WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988).
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989).
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (internal citation omitted).
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was the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which
includes a ban on juvenile executions.8 4 Because that treaty had been
ratified by every State worldwide except Somalia and the United
States, the Court found that "the United States now stands alone in a
85
world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty."
The Supreme Court, in its death penalty jurisprudence,
explicitly recognizes processes of expressive theory. In looking to the
beliefs of other States, the Court responds to two main concerns. The
first is the impact of jurisprudence on global esteem, which the Court
explicitly recognizes when it notes that approving the death penalty
would leave the United States "standing alone" in the community of
States. The Court also clearly demonstrates its understanding that
international
norms and treaties
may influence
domestic
jurisprudence by influencing our domestic beliefs regarding the
underlying issues. The exogenous influence is a product of the United
States' self-identification as a culturally Western State. Consider the
simple syllogism behind the Supreme Court's analysis of the death
penalty: (1) the United States is a civilized State with strong ties to
Western States and their traditions, (2) both civilized States and
culturally Western States uniformly believe the death penalty should
not be applied in certain situations, (3) the consistently held beliefs of
these States should be instructive to the United States' own view of
the death penalty in these situations. This line of reasoning recognizes
that one source of information on objective reality is the beliefs of
other, similarly-situated States. Put simply, the Court reasons: "They
are like us and they don't apply the death penalty, we might infer
from this that there is something uncivil about its application."
Domestic belief is not changed because of specific information
regarding the particular harms of the death penalty (for instance, if
empirical evidence demonstrated that the existence of the death
penalty increased the likelihood of homicide because criminals
believed they had no incentive to refrain from egregious violence).
Rather, belief may be changed because of inferences drawn from
others' changed beliefs. This dynamic interplay between group
members provides the basis for international norms to effect domestic
norms.
We have to this point identified the processes by which
international regimes may expressly influence domestic law and
behavior. International process and ratification can influence domestic
regulation as well as market behavior through a number of different
84. Id. at 576. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA. Res. 44/25, at
161, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989).
85. Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (internal citations omitted).
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mechanisms. Where process produces information, that information
may influence preference and in turn perceptions of the subjective
norm. Ratification in certain conditions may have similar effects. For
instance, ratification can also carry information on what behaviors
others prefer or are willing to socially sanction. There are thus a wide
variety of ways in which treaty-making and ratification can influence
domestic processes.
These processes do not work in a vacuum; context must also be
considered. A number of factors may also increase or decrease the
domestic effects of ratification. If a State develops domestic law to
comply with a treaty's standards, that law may, in turn, have further
expressive impact. Similarly, the pre-existing beliefs of the populous
may significantly influence the domestic impact of international
process. We have already discussed how preexisting belief may
influence perceptions of objective reality. Preexisting belief may also
affect beliefs about the subjective norm. If, for example, a State's
citizens believed the State's leaders were ratifying a treaty only due to
international pressure and in spite of public preference, ratification
would likely have no effect on understanding of majority preference.
In this way, each situation of international regulation presents its own
unique set of factors to which the tools of expressive theory can be
applied in order to determine their likely domestic affect.
2. Indirect Influences on Normative Belief
Indirect influences can also affect a State's normative belief
and thereby change its actions. Individuals and entities without
formal positions in the political sphere, such as persons with
recognized moral status (e.g., an imprisoned Nelson Mandela),8 6
celebrities from the entertainment world (for instance, French actress
Brigitte Bardot, a strong advocate of animal rights),8 7 and media
outlets,8 8 can impel States to honor their international obligations by
influencing estimations of the likelihood of sanctions. Among indirect
actors, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") often play a key role
in promoting international law observance by influencing the
86. See NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM (Little, Brown & Co. 1994). Put
another way, certain individuals who are representative of the moral point of view can influence
the perceptions of what behaviors are preferred by "moral" nations. See infra note 118
(describing the representativeness heuristic and its impact on norm perception).
87. BARNETT SINGER, BRIGITTE BARDOT: A BIOGRAPHY (McFarland & Co. 2006). High
visibility increases the availability of information on a particular point of view, thus serving to
influence perceptions of others' preferences. See infra note 119 (describing the availability
heuristic and its impact on norm perception).
88. For a detailed description within one national context, see Benjamin L. Liebman,
Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2005).
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subjective norm. This is especially true in the context of human rights
89
treaties.
A central function of NGOs is investigating international
human rights violations and disseminating information on these
abuses. NGO-issued human rights reports are usually framed against
a State's previous ratification of one or more human rights
conventions, and point to particular acts as violating those
agreements. 90 Hence, NGOs use the historical fact of a State's prior
agreement to abide by international norms, and its present desire for
esteem from other States also bound by those accords, to shame a noncomplying State into altering its conduct. 91 One commentator notes
that this tactic is "particularly effective where a government is
sensitive to international public opinion," 92 but this understates the
point. It is precisely because States value esteem from the global
community that they are compelled, through the need-reinforcement
principle, to alter their actions and thereby avoid the disapprobation
of their peers. NGOs are especially well placed to alter a State's
normative belief because their main currency is disseminating
information that can erode a State's global reputation. Bringing
pressure to bear through negative publicity leverages non-complying
States to alter their behavior and honor their international
obligations .93
To illustrate how an NGO can change a State's estimation of
the subjective norm, consider the actions of Mental Disability Rights
International ("MDRI"), an NGO promoting "international oversight"

89. See generally NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005)
(discussing different approaches that might create international accountability for non-State
actors). Although we focus on NGOs in this Article, we note that the contributors to this
collection correctly point out and explain the role of other non-State actors, for example
multinational corporations and international agencies, in enforcing human rights regimes.
90. The mandate of the global NGO Human Rights Watch, for example, includes
documenting and reporting abuses that violate international instruments prohibiting torture
and the subordination of women. An overview of that organization's activities is available at
Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
91. "The pointed finger of shame.., has caused executions to be stayed, death sentences to
be commuted, torture to be stopped, prison conditions to be ameliorated, prisoners to be released,
and more attention to be paid to the fundamental rights of many citizens." David S. Weissbrodt,
The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Implementation of Human
Rights, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 293, 298 (1977).
92. Laurie S. Wiseberg, Protecting Human Rights Activists and NGOs: What More Can Be
Done?, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 525, 531 (1991).
93. See, e.g., Michael H. Posner & Candy Whittome, The Status of Human Rights NGOs, 25
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 269, 272 (1994) (noting that NGOs "have helped to transform the
debate from a restrained diplomatic discourse among governments to a more urgent and real
confrontation of ongoing and serious human rights crises").
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on the human rights of persons with intellectual disabilities. 94 After a
two-year investigation, MDRI released a detailed report and press
release of human rights abuses against mentally disabled children
and adults in Hungary's national mental health system. 95 Among the
findings of MDRI's investigators were that Hungarian children with
disabilities were excluded from schools and placed for the rest of their
lives in institutions; that adult residents of "social care" (i.e., nursing)
homes, psychiatric institutions and general hospital psychiatric wards
were subjected to lifelong inhuman and degrading treatment; and that
among the "care" given to mentally disabled persons was being "placed
into cages for unlimited time periods without supervision." 96 MDRI
asserted that these actions violated established human rights covered
by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 97 the
European Convention on Human Rights, 98 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 99 In response to
the international negative publicity generated by MDRI's report, 10 0
Hungary promulgated new disability rights legislation, and
established a human rights ombudsman system to protect
institutionalized persons. 10 1
Hungary's reconsideration of the human rights of persons with
mental disabilities in state-run institutions following MDRI's
allegations of human rights abuses fit neatly within the needreinforcement framework. At the time of MDRI's report, some eight
years after its political emancipation from the former Soviet Union,
94. An overview is provided in the organization's website, which is available at Mental
Disability Rights International, http://www.mdri.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2006). What follows is
drawn from press releases, human rights reports, and sources posted therein.
95. MDRI's investigators visited and interviewed people in both institutional and "social
care" (nursing home) settings. See ERIC ROSENTHAL ET AL.,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL

HEALTH: HUNGARY (1997), http://www.mdri.org/pdf/Hungary.pdf.
96. Id. at 16-18.
97. G.A. Res. 2200A, at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19,
1966).
98. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
213 U.N.T.S. 222 (Sept. 3, 1953).
99. G.A. Res. 2200A, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966). Curiously, MDRI might also have asserted violations of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, at 166, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989), as well as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No.
51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984).
100. In contrast, widespread publicity within Hungary had almost no effect. See Gabor
Gombos et al., Hungary: The Social Care Home Report, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 361,
363-69 (2002) (describing the pace of progress in Hungary's mental health care institutions
following release of MDRI's report).
101. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH: HUNGARY, supra note 95, at 6-7 (describing
new disability rights legislation promulgated by Hungary).
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Hungary aspired to join the Western community of States and sought
their approbation. The report and the publicity it engendered
produced reputational damage and esteem loss for Hungary from the
United States and the European Union, which in turn caused
Hungary to recant its policies and alter its behavior. In other words,
as an NGO, MDRI indirectly affected Hungary's estimations of utility
by changing that State's perception of the likelihood that failure to
abide by an international norm would result in a loss of esteem in the
eyes of other countries. In order to counter the effects of the release of
this information, Hungary took action that remedied the esteem
loss.

10 2

III. CLARIFICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EXPRESSIVE MODEL

As we have just discussed, the expressive theory provides a
detailed model of how international process affects the willingness of
States to ratify and comply with treaties. One other strength of the
theory is its ability to explain, at least in part, a number of issues
where international law scholars either find themselves at odds with
one another or where there is simply no reliable understanding of a
particular State's action. These include providing a way of
harmonizing divergent viewpoints on the ability of international
regimes to construct the identities of States, whether the social force is
different than traditionally understood forces of coercion and
persuasion, how norms become internalized and what information
signals may carry. This Part will apply expressive theory toward a
better understanding of these and other issues.
A. HarmonizingRationalismand Constructivism
Discussion of how international law affects behavior generally
divides into two schools of thought: the rationalists, who emphasize
military-economic power, and the constructivists, who focus on norms
and global ideational structure. 10 3 The rationalist/constructivist divide
also resonates within arguments regarding the primary means for
achieving compliance among States. Accordingly, rationalists believe

102. MDRI has followed similar strategies in other emerging countries seeking global
esteem. See generally Eric Rosenthal, The Application of International Human Rights Law to
InstitutionalMental Disability Law, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 387 (2002) (transcript of
remarks by Eric Rosenthal, MDRI's founder and executive director). For additional, countryspecific reports, see MDRI's website, supra note 94.
103. Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 6, at 632-33; see also Koh,
Internationalization,supra note 2, at 976 (discussing how the dialectic between those who take
interests as a given and those who take them as constructed developed).
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that coercion is the force by which compliance is created, while
constructivists emphasize persuasion.104
The rationalist/constructionalist divide has served to straightjacket efforts to consider in depth the force of social processes on
compliance. Lack of an independent model of how social forces work
hampers discussion and design of international regimes. As Goodman
and Jinks have observed, it is not that "international legal scholarship
has completely failed to identify aspects" of how social forces affect
state behavior. Rather, the mechanism by which this happens is
"poorly understood... and often conflated (or confused) with other
constructivist mechanisms such as persuasion." 10 5 Put simply, without
a better understanding of how normative compliance forces operate,
we cannot form an accurate account of how best to achieve compliance
in any given situation. 06 The expressive theory provides substantial
insights into this lacuna. By identifying the framework and
microprocesses of normative influence, the expressive theory provides
a means for discussing the differences between normative and other
influences on State behavior. Further, the expressive theory suggests
when the different mechanisms of change are most effective.
Our expressive theory is primarily a rationalist understanding
of normative behavior. It is based on the notion that rational States
have preferences to be "esteemed members" of international society
due to the increased benefits that come from cooperation. However,
the expressive theory diverges from purely rational actor methodology
in two significant ways. First, it does not concur with the rational
actor determination that coercion is the force by which compliance is
created. Second, because expressive theory draws on the desire for
esteem rather than on coercion as the motivating factor, it also
recognizes that international processes have constructive effects.
Constructivists argue that interests are socially constructed by
commonly held principles, identities, behavior norms, or shared terms

104. Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 6, at 633-34; Koh,
Internationalization, supra note 2, at 976. For a discussion of these two schools, their
assumptions and limitations, see Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 194462.
105. Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 6, at 626-27; see also Koh,
Internationalization, supra note 2, at 980-81; Alvarez, supra note 7, at 970 (interpreting
Goodman & Jinks's concept of acculturation).
106. See also Dinah Shelton, Compliance with International Human Rights Soft Law, in
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 119, 131-32 (Edith Brown Weiss ed.,
1997) (decrying adequate methodologies for adequately examining compliance); Beth A.
Simmons, International Law and International Relations: Scholarship at the Intersection of
Principlesand Politics, 95 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 271, 273-78 (2001) (lamenting the dearth and
depth of interdisciplinary examinations of central issues, including compliance).
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of discourse. 10 7 This constructivist school also shares ties to the
English "international society" school because both believe that States
obey international rules for reasons beyond mere calculations of how
compliance or noncompliance will affect their interests.10 8 They believe
instead that State decisions are influenced by the pull of international
society, itself a force that derives from States' long-term interests in
the maintenance of international community. 0 9
The need-reinforcement component of expressive theory
provides the link between the constructivist and rationalist
approaches. By harmonizing theories from these distinct schools of
thought, it provides a more comprehensive framework for
understanding and predicting State behavior. Need-reinforcement
demonstrates how rational self-interest can lead to a separate desire
(or preference) to maintain relations with other States. Like the
rationalists, need-reinforcement describes the desire to be members of
international society as a result of the benefits these States will
receive through cooperation. This desire, however, exists separately
from other preferences-it is a preference for esteem and not a
preference for material or economic benefit-and can serve as a
powerful influence on the willingness of States to conform to law.
Similarly, the need-reinforcement principle provides a better
understanding of groups and group discourse. As we have seen in our
earlier discussion of need reinforcement, the key to social influence is
that an individual identify with a particular group. Further, that
group membership derives from cooperative benefit borne of frequent
and long-term interaction. At some point, group membership attracts
one to other members of the group generally. Over time, the group will
develop commonly-held norms. Behaviors for which clearly developed
norms do not exist, however, would be open to group "negotiation."
We start our discussion of how interests are constructed with
the premise that not all norms are clearly developed or entrenched. In
many cases, States simply may not have perfect (or even accurate)

107. See Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2633.
108. Id. at 2634 ("The predominantly American constructivist school has close familial ties to
the English 'international society' school of Grotian heritage."). Koh cites Andrew Hurrell, John
Vincent, Barry Buzan, Gerritt Gong, Richard Little, and Michael Donelan as modern scholars
who work in this vein. Id. at 2634 n.181.
109. E.g., CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, at 27-28; Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the
Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1947 (1990); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties:
A Synthesis of InternationalRelations Theory and InternationalLaw, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139
(1996); see also Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological
Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219, 220-21 (1997) (advancing a psychologically based
theory of compliance).
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information on the preferences of others. 110 This normative
misperception is often referred to as pluralistic ignorance, a condition
in which nearly all members of a group believe that virtually all other
group members support certain norms, even as these same individuals
privately reject that behavior.1 1 1 A renaissance of recent work in the
field has demonstrated the phenomenon's existence in a wide variety
of group contexts, 11 2 although the phenomenon has been understood
for well over seventy years.1 13 Although the reasons for the existence
of pluralistic ignorance have not yet been fully developed, this wideranging experimental work demonstrates that a number of factors,
including lack of information and misinformation regarding other
States' preferences, may lead to uncertainty regarding norms in a
1 14
wide-variety of contexts.
When norms are uncertain, the process of international law
making can serve to construct normative beliefs. Let us consider an
example that will help identify some of these constructive
mechanisms. Assume five States, in geographic proximity to each
other and with strong diplomatic and economic ties, are experiencing
an influx of immigrants from nearby States. Assume further that the
110. See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory, supra note 70, at 355-56 (describing the variety of
ways in which individuals may lack perfect information on the approval patterns of others).
111. Id. at 356-57.
112. See generally David Hines et al., PluralisticIgnorance and Health Risk Behaviors: Do
College Students Misperceive Social Approval for Risky Behaviors on Campus and in Media?, 32
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2621, 2622 (2002) (stating that pluralistic ignorance is a pervasive
feature of social life: "It has been found to characterize the dynamics of social situations...
social groups... and social movements..."). For specific discussions of pluralistic ignorance in a
variety of groups see Cristina Bicchieri & Yoshitaka Fukui, The Great Illusion: Ignorance,
Informational Cascades, and the Persistenceof UnpopularNorms, in EXPERIENCE, REALITY, AND
SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 89, 93 (Maria Carla Galavotti & A. Pagnini eds., 1999) (citations
omitted) (gang members and prison guards).
113. For example, as far back as the 1930s Richard Schanck demonstrated how members of
the Methodist Church in Elm Hollow were almost unanimous in outwardly supporting norms
against card playing, drinking alcohol, and smoking while privately undertaking these
behaviors.
114. While a comprehensive understanding of pluralistic ignorance does not yet exist, those
who study the phenomenon generally agree that it is based on a propensity of individuals to
perceive their motivation for acting as different from others. See Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T.
Miller, PluralisticIgnorance and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving
the Social Norm, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 243, 244 (1993). In particular, social
psychologists have demonstrated that an individual may understand his or her own actions to be
normatively controlled but perceive others to act out of preference or true belief. See Hines et. al.,
supra note 112; see also Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller, PluralisticIgnorance and the
Perpetuation of Social Norms by Unwitting Actors, in 28 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 161, 162 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1996). For a discussion of the self/other difference and its
sources, see Bicchieri & Fukui, supra note 112, at 97; see also Dale T. Miller & Deborah A.
Prentice, Collective Errors and Errors About the Collective, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 541, 544-45 (1994) (suggesting the bias is based on the cultural propensity to
underestimate the power of social motives to influence behavior).
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five States are considering whether to enter into an agreement that
provides immigrants with certain basic rights (say, health care and
other financially costly social benefits) and that, at this point, three of
the five States generally disfavor providing rights to immigrants, and
two are slightly in favor of doing so.
During the process of negotiating an agreement, the parties
will reveal their preferences more clearly. After a general discussion of
the topic, an observer with good information would likely conclude
that there exists a norm against providing rights to immigrants in this
region, albeit a weak one. The negotiation, however, provides an
opportunity for States to influence both the preferences and normative
belief of others. A pro-treaty State may attempt to change other group
members' perceptions of objective reality through the provision of
information, for instance, by explaining how providing these rights
will incentivize workers with technical skills to emigrate and fill a
need in the workforce. The pro-treaty State may also attempt to
change the reticent States' perceptions of the subjective norm. It may
appeal to more broadly held norms such as "equality" or "fairness" as a
means of either decreasing estimations of the likelihood of being
sanctioned by the other States, or perhaps of attempting to convince
115
other States that a pro-immigration norm exists within the group.
In a similar vein, the pro-treaty State may appeal to well
established and more specific norms in the global community to which
the five States belong. If the State can point to a generally held
universal norm of fair treatment of immigrants, this too can influence
expectations of social sanction. This latter point recognizes that
normative influence can transcend the boundaries of the specific group
of States that are negotiating the treaty. States identify themselves as
members of more than one group. They may find the influence of
certain States with whom they share strong bonds to be greater than
others to whom they are more loosely connected because they evaluate
the esteem from these different group members differently. Such loose
connections, however, still exert some degree of normative force based
on the desire for esteem from these other group members. In this
sense, group identity plays a key role in the influence of normative
belief, and the beliefs of all States with whom a State identifies
116
become relevant to its analysis of the subjective norm.
115. McAdams has described such a phenomenon, explaining how certain specific behaviors
may be made normative by connecting them to more universally held and generalized norms.
McAdams, The Origin, supra note 66, at 383.
116. In this way a large block of nations, for example, Western Democracies, may exert
influence on matters between other group members to which they are not even part. See
generally Diane M. Mackie & Sarah Queller, The Impact of Group Membership on Persuasion:
Revisiting "Who Says What to Whom with What Effect?," in ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL
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Finally, a number of heuristics 117 may further influence
normative perception. States (as well as NGOs) may attempt to use
States identified as representatives of the group to affect the norm
estimations of other group members."18 They may also attempt to
make the information that supports their normative claims more
available in order to skew norm perception. 119 If these forces change
the intent of even one of the three reticent group members, then a
tipping point is reached and a weak pro-treaty norm will be
established. Expressive mechanisms that rely on self-identification,
along with other efforts to make aggregate group preference more
certain, can be used to influence the interests of rational States.
Indeed, in the case of treaties that are dependent on the normative
mechanism, this force will be the primary, if not the only, means by
which international processes may proceed. This example makes clear
that interests of others within the group or a different group with
which the States identify can be used to affect the way interests are
"constructed" through the commonly held principles, identities,
behavioral norms and terms of discourse suggested by Koh.
In sum, the expressive theory recognizes that interest theory
and constructive theory can be squared. While States maintain
preferences for the esteem of others, given uncertain and constantly
changing normative belief, established interests rarely exist at the
outset of international discussions. Rather, discussions between States
play the role of influencing normative belief and, in turn, the interests
of States.
B. DistinguishingPersuasion,Reputation,and Coercion
Failure to understand more clearly the differences between
forces of coercion, persuasion and reputation hamper efforts at regime
CONTEXT: THE ROLE OF NORMS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP, supra note 29, at 135 (providing

empirical evidence of and discussing the importance of approval from other group members).
117. Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts that allow individuals to meaningfully process
probabilistic information. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051,
1127-34 (2000) (describing the effect of social norms on deviations from self-interest).
118. The representativeness heuristic "refers to the tendency of actors to ignore base rates
and overestimate the correlation between what something appears to be and what something
actually is." Id. at 1086; see also Dale T. Miller et. al., Pluralistic Ignorance and Inconsistency
Between Private Attitudes and Public Behavior, in ATTITUDES, BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL CONTEXT:
THE ROLE OF NORMS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP, supra note 29, at 95, 103-12 (discussing the

exaggerated normative influence of those who embody the norms of a particular group).
119. Availability refers to the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of certain outcomes
due to the fact that information regarding that outcome is more "vivid, well-publicized, or more
prevalent among a particular actor's friends and acquaintances." Korobkin & Ulen, supra note
117, at 1087-88.
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design and make identification of the most effective compliance tools
unattainable. The expressive model provides a basic understanding of
when a state is persuading, using reputational measures, or coercing
compliance. While there is some overlap, the expressive model treats
persuasion, reputation, and coercion as primarily distinct forces.
Consider first the distinction between persuasion and
reputation. According to the expressive model, persuasion occurs when
an actor attempts to use information regarding objective reality to
revise estimates of certainty or evaluation of non-normative
preferences, while normative or reputational influence occurs when
information on the subjective norm is communicated. Consider the
beliefs of the State in Figures 7 and 8 regarding global warming. Over
time, the science regarding global warming changes the State's
estimation of the likelihood that seas will rise, destroying a portion of
its coastline and inland areas, and increasing the number of cancers.
At some point, the certainty of these harms increases, in turn
changing a preference from non-compliance to compliance. This is true
persuasion: the information changes the State's beliefs to the point
that it now prefers to comply. As discussed above, persuasion also
affects normative belief; thus, no act is purely persuasive. However, to
the extent that information acts directly to influence beliefs about
objective reality, it would be fair to characterize the normative
influence of this behavior as an indirect-and thus secondarybenefit. On the other hand, when efforts are focused directly on
changing beliefs regarding the subjective norm, those efforts are
primarily reputational.
Now consider the difference between reputation and coercion.
The key to this distinction is that reputation works on the subjective
norm while coercion implicates preference for factors beyond the scope
of the treaty. For example, specific aid money or restraint from the use
of military force may be considered coercive because each operates on
preferences that lie outside of a treaty regime. By contrast,
reputational forces work by their appeal to the general benefit one
derives from being a group member.
Note that in this respect, coercion is not like persuasion in that
the latter relates to the goals of the international regime and provides
a means for explaining how the regime itself will further preference.
Coercion recognizes that persuasive and reputational forces are not
sufficient to create compliance. Rather, there are other benefits or
detriments necessary to achieve compliance goals. In this sense,
reputational forces exhibit the characteristics of both coercion and
persuasion. They are coercive to the extent that they are outside the
attitude of a State; they are persuasive because they reflect an
existing preference for esteem. Reputational forces are distinct from
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coercion and persuasion, however, in that they act on a particular
preference-the preference for the esteem of other States.
Another dividing point between coercion and persuasion is
autonomy. In the event of coercion, a State's autonomy is violated
because it is brought to comply with a position that it would otherwise
oppose. Persuasion may likewise bring a State to heed a regime
dynamic that under other circumstances it would resist, but the
State's autonomy is maintained because it "voluntarily" agreed to this
otherwise undesired regime. In real world terms, these categories may
devolve down to the proverbial stick and carrot, even if the end result
120
looks much the same.
C. ExplainingInternalization
The expressive model also helps us to understand exactly how
the rules of a particular treaty become internalized. Many scholars
recognize that voluntary obedience arising from internalization of a
norm, rather than coerced compliance, is the preferred enforcement
mechanism. 121 The question that remains, however, is how norms
become internalized. To date, current understanding of internalization
within international law scholarship has been limited.1 22 Generally,
internalization is equated with a dynamic process of identification,
repetition and feedback. Harold Koh, for example, describes the
process as starting with the identification of a norm as a result of an
interaction between transnational actors. 23 Once the norm is
announced, certain transnational actors seek to bind other States to

120. In defining this taxonomy, we expressly reject purely existential notions of volition. For
example, we disallow claims that poor women without employment prospects and in dire
economic straights "voluntarily" engaged in prostitution or other illegal activity.
121. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 1, are emblematic of this assertion. For additional, and
varied examples, see Robert C. Bird, Procedural Challenges to Environmental Regulation of
Space Debris, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 635, 645-49 (2003) (discussing the promotion of cooperation
rather than sanctions); George W. Downs et al., The TransformationalModel of International
Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 465, 468 (2000)
(discussing how empirical evidence of horizontal cooperation "carrots" shows it as more
efficacious than vertical coercive "sticks"); Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating
in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1229, 1243-88 (2004) (providing a game theory model to demonstrate the proclivity of States to
cooperate due to inter-connected relationships); Guzman, supra note 3, at 1849 (finding that
States are motivated by cooperative gains).
122. See Posner, supra note 13, at 824 (arguing that, while constructivist scholars rely
heavily on the notion of internalization, they have yet to develop a theory of how internalization
happens).
123. See Koh, Why Do Nations, supra note 3, at 2646 (internal citations omitted) (describing
three phases of processes of transnational actors).
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"obey the [norm] as part of [their] internal value set."1 24 According to
Koh:
Such a transnational legal process is normative, dynamic, and constitutive. The
transaction generates a legal rule, which will guide future transnational interactions
between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those norms; and
eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to reconstitute the interests
125
and even the identities of the participants in the process.

This model, however, confuses compliance that results from a
desire for esteem or from habit with the process of internalization. A
simple thought experiment highlights the difference. Imagine a group
of States with a well-entrenched norm that education is a primary
basic human right.126 Imagine further that one member of the group is
an agricultural country with poor economic conditions, where the basic
goal of State spending is subsistence and public health. Education is
not accorded as high a preference in such a country, but it
nevertheless feels pressure from the well-established norm to provide
education to its populace.
Now assume that the other group members have lost their
ability to determine whether the agricultural State is providing
education so that there are no more reputational effects tied to
compliance. At some point, one would expect the practice of providing
education to evolve and the preference of using resources to other ends
to assert itself.127 Long-term interaction with other States regarding
the well-established norm has not resulted in that norm somehow
permeating the consciousness of the agricultural State; internalization
has not occurred. Rather, internalization occurs in circumstances
where, if the normative factors are removed, a State still believes it is
in its best interest to follow a particular behavior. 128 The State, in
Koh's terms, obeys because of its own internal values. In that case, the
State is no longer acting out of regard for external social sanctions
(opprobrium by fellow States for not providing public education), but it
is acting out of preference (because it has come to regard positively the
provision of public education). Nor is it likely that simple repetition of
a behavior (providing pubic education) will affect its internalization.
124. Id.
125. Id.

126. As indeed, they have through the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25
at 166, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989).
127. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 117, at 1113-15 (noting that habits can be rational in
the global sense but recognizing that past behavior does not affect the preference structure of an
actor).
128. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1603, 1626 n.51 (2000) (noting that internalization must be the result of changed
preference); Geisinger, supra note 17, at 66 (arguing that internalization can only be equated
with a preference change).
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These beliefs are more likely to change due to changes in information
129
about objective reality.
This is not to imply that the process outlined by Koh does not
influence behavior (or that his contributions to the field have been
anything less than seminal). What we point out is that when these
processes act, they do so through the mechanism of increasing norm
certainty suggested by the expressive model, rather than
internalization as suggested by Koh. Indeed, the above quotation
provides wonderful insight into how complex interaction can construct
and develop normative belief. But consider Koh's example in a new
light; that is, let us re-write his appraisal in the context of the forces
that impact normative belief. At the beginning of the process, the
norm relevant to a situation is unknown or, at most, uncertain.
Announcement of the norm begins the move toward increased
certainty. As other States are guided by the norm, certainty that a
particular behavior is norm-congruent increases, with a corresponding
increase in the esteem a State would expect from acting in accordance
with the norm. This leads more States to act in accordance with the
norm. Over time, this norm cascade continues until a point where the
norm becomes entrenched in the fabric of international society.
This reinvention of Koh's intrepid insights helps clarify how
State desire for esteem can be harnessed by international legal
process. Legal process provides not just focal points for cooperation,
but also an iterative process of norm development and entrenchment
that carries with it strong influence on the behavior of States.
D. Explaining Signaling
The expressive theory also adds insights to discussions of how
States may signal each other through treaty ratification and
compliance. Signaling theory takes as its starting point the
presumption that States communicate their cooperative nature to
others by undertaking certain behaviors that reflect their willingness
to forego immediate benefit for long-term gain. 130 States that
undertake the most expensive signals demonstrate their low discount
rates; that is, they demonstrate the higher value they place on future

129. There are a number of real-life examples of this phenomenon. Eastern European
nations that were previously members of the Soviet Union, for example, now speak their native
languages instead of Russian, and have also returned to their own native faiths and national
identities. Much the same can be said for the situation in Northern Ireland.
130. For a more complete discussion, see POSNER, supra note 46, at 18-22 (providing the
foundational exegesis of signaling theory in law); Moore, supra note 8, at 883-85 (adapting
Posner's theory to the context of human rights).
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payoffs than States that don't undertake such behaviors. 1 1 These low
discount rates translate into those States being better cooperative
partners because it is less likely that a state that values long-term
gains will defect from cooperative relationships for short-term
32
benefits.1
A signaling theory of international law proceeds to consider the
types of signals that States create through ratification and compliance
behavior. A variety of different equilibria resulting from signaling in
the international context can develop. It has been suggested that, over
time, state practice might be separated into four rough categories:
acceding and complying States, acceding and noncomplying States,
nonacceding
and
complying
States, and
nonacceding
and
noncomplying States. Those States that accede and comply, of course,
demonstrate the lowest discount rate, while those who neither accede
nor comply show the highest likelihood to defect from cooperative
relationships. 133
Signaling theory, however, remains incompletely understood.
In particular, it suffers from certain limitations on the ability to
describe how States "agree" what behaviors are signals and about the
content of these signals. A signal is only worthwhile if members of the
community understand what it means. Advocates of signaling theory
recognize this limitation and the particular problems of developing
shared meaning in an international society that is itself comprised of
many different cultures. 34 Should, for example, ratification be
considered a signal? Should compliance? Should both? As a way of
engaging this problem, it might be suggested that signaling is the
result of "general perceptions of performance in an area rather than
individual actions in individual cases."'135 But this begs the question of
"whose perception": for if meaning has to be shared, then how does
subjective perception matter? It further begs the question of which
general perceptions amount to signals, and which do not.1 36 Such
difficulty in identifying the behaviors and content of signals results in
131. POSNER, supra note 46, at 17.

132. Id.
133. Moore, supra note 8, at 903.
134. Id. at 901-02 (internal citations omitted). While they cannot explain how the process
happens, they rely generally on the fact that it is in nations' interests to agree on meaning so
that signaling can take place.
135. Id. at 896.
136. See McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates, supra note 54, at 676 (arguing that the most
efficient means of producing a reputation for a particular behavior is performing the behavior
and that this reputational strategy will almost always overcome the signaling strategy, thus
suggesting that few behaviors will be signals); see also Moore, supra note 8, at 896 (recognizing
that if the costs of a signal are sufficiently low or the benefits sufficiently high then both states
with high and low discount rates will signal).
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a theory that is primarily descriptive. If a State's behaviors are
perceived as cooperative then those behaviors are signals. If they are
not perceived as cooperative then those behaviors are not signals.
Expressive law provides a more complete basis for
understanding just how behaviors carry information regarding
cooperativeness. This mechanism is somewhat different than the
signaling mechanism. As previously described, expressive theory
explains that States seek the esteem of others because of the operation
of a need-reinforcement mechanism that results in an attraction to
others with whom a State shares cooperative benefits. States are thus
interested in what other States prefer and do not prefer, and norms
simply reflect the aggregate preferences of group members. Normcongruent behavior, in turn, signals ones' evaluation of group esteem.
The more willing a State is to abide by less certain norms, the more it
values group membership. Behavior does not thus carry information
on discount rate but on the importance of group membership. A State
that highly values esteem from the group is less likely to act in
defiance of the group's norms.
In sum, expressive theory generally supports the notion that
States signal their nature to other States through certain behaviors.
Expressive theory, however, suggests that States ratify and comply
with treaties not to provide information on discount rate, but to,
instead, signal their attraction to the group. While evaluation of group
esteem provides the basis for understanding a State's cooperativeness,
certainty of preference will provide a basis for determining whether
ratification or compliance will act as a signal. That is, the more a
group of States identifies a preference for particular behaviors
associated with a treaty, the more certainty a member of the group
has that the behaviors will receive esteem.
E. Implications
The expressive model provides a framework for considering
both the decision to enter into a treaty regime, as well as the decision
whether to comply with the regime afterwards. The model suggests
that the pull of international society can exert significant influence on
the willingness of States to enter into treaties. Moreover, while signals
of compliance may be more ambiguous, and thus harder to
understand, normative forces can also impact significantly the
willingness to comply with these agreements.
Let us begin with a discussion of the influence exerted by
international norms on ratification. The force is two-fold. First, a State
must consider the esteem benefit it receives from ratification. Second,
it must consider the foregone disapprobation it will receive by not
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ratifying. Recall the example of a newly formed Islamic democracy
discussed above, and assume that it has two relevant preferences.
That State wishes to increase its esteem with others, and it also has a
general desire to not recognize or advance the particular rights being
advanced by the CEDAW as far as providing the franchise to
women. 137 In such a case we would assume that the State would not
ratify the treaty. Indeed, under this model we expect a State only to
enter into the CEDAW if (as posited above) the normative benefit
outweighs the sum of all other costs. While normative pressures can
be very substantial, the general notion that norms on their own can
result in ratification of a significant number of treaties is certainly
thrown into question by such an understanding.
Now take into account the costs associated with not ratifying
the CEDAW in terms of negative esteem. That is, by not joining the
treaty regime, the newly democratic Islamic State will suffer esteem
costs from failure to uphold the recognized international norm that
favors women's equality while also gaining no other benefit.1 38 Assume
the amount of decreased esteem will roughly mirror the expected
increase that would come from ratification. In such a case, in addition
to foregoing the esteem benefit that would result from joining the
treaty regime, that State undergoes esteem loss. Where this is true,
the newly democratic Islamic State, despite its ex ante preferences,
will be much more inclined to ratify the CEDAW. The picture painted
by the expressive law model supports the general notion that
normative influences can make rational States ratify treaties. Indeed,
foregone reputational losses may be responsible for some heavy lifting
in terms of creating incentives to join treaty regimes.
The theory further suggests that, to the extent the costs of
making ambiguous the message sent by ratification are lower than the
costs of complying with a treaty, a State will choose to do the former.
Two major variables are relevant to the decision to ratify or comply for
normative purposes: the effect of monitoring and the impact of

137. We could, of course, model specific beliefs regarding undertaking the behaviors required
by a treaty. For example, a treaty standard requiring accommodating disabled individuals may
carry with it a large number of underlying beliefs. Such a standard will cost money to the
government in the form of accommodations and will slow the economy by taking business
resources and the disabled are not capable workers compared with the rest of the workforce. The
leader of that nation will evaluate each of these beliefs and its certainty to reach an ultimate
belief about the behavior. For the sake of simplicity, we present this more complex calculus in
terms of ultimate belief.
138. The negative reaction aimed at the United States for not supporting the Kyoto Protocol
is another example of such disesteem. For an overview of the negotiation techniques and an
evaluation of their likely success, see Jutta Brunn6e, A Fine Balance: Facilitation and
Enforcement in the Design of a Compliance Regime for the Kyoto Protocol, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.

223 (2000).
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resource limitations. An important variable and its effect on this key
issue in current human rights scholarship is the effect of monitoring
on decisions to enter treaties. Monitoring is the key to reputational
enforcement. Under the expressive model, norms are endogenous; they
reflect the preferences of other State members of a group. One follows
such norms out of a desire for esteem (or to avoid disesteem). If a
State could act contrary to the norm without surveillance, the State
would receive no esteem or disesteem and thus would not be
139
concerned regarding the normative consequences of its actions.
The second major variable arises from the understanding that
many States are not able to reach a treaty's goals due to financial or
other limitations. As a result, many international treaties stipulate
that States need only make progress that is reasonable in light of
resources. 140 The existence of such a standard provides some basis for
States to ambiguate the signal sent when human rights violations are
found. They do so by recognizing that their behavior counters the
norm and by expressing their concern, while also characterizing the
behavior as previously unknown or fiscally unavoidable. In such a
manner, the State maintains the status it receives through ratification
and limits or completely neutralizes the disesteem it would otherwise
receive for violating the norm. Because of the ability to make signals
more ambiguous, one would expect States from whom progressive
realization is required to feel less normative pressure to comply than
to ratify.
Let us return to an earlier example of the five States
deliberating whether to ratify a treaty providing immigrants with
basic social entitlements to consider the interaction of these forces on
a decision based on regime structure. At one end of the continuum is a
regime without monitoring, but one that contains clear standards on
measuring reasonable implementation. In such a case, ratification
would likely be universal. This is because even the low esteem benefit
that arises from agreeing to the terms of an essentially aspirational
regime will outweigh the costs needed to implement it. However, as
discussed previously, compliance will likely also be minimal. At the

139. This is similar to domestic examples of individuals who decry drinking, smoking,
spousal abuse, or the use of pornography in public, but feel free to undertake such behaviors
behind closed doors.
140. A seminal example is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966). After setting out broad aspirations, the treaty mandates that "[e]ach State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to take steps... to the maximum of its available resources, with a
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant." Id. at Article 2.
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other extreme is a regime that requires complete compliance with its
terms through strong monitoring procedures.
Assume for example that there are three different strategies
available for providing immigrants with social rights. In ascending
order of cost, these are the relatively low cost of requesting voluntary
compliance with a rule empowering immigrants (inexpensive because
it cannot be enforced), the moderate cost of providing health care and
unemployment benefits to only those immigrants unable to sustain
themselves (restrained, because most States will not allow these
individuals entry in the first place), and the high cost of entitling
immigrants to the same range of social benefits bestowed on all
citizens (expensive due to the ratio of benefits provided to taxes paid).
If a standard required implementation of the high cost strategy and
failure to comply would almost certainly be discovered, the costs would
be dramatically different. Certainty of esteem loss would be great and
only those States for whom esteem benefits would outweigh the high
costs of implementation would join the regime. For example, if the
certain loss of esteem was less than compliance costs, that State would
not join. One would expect such a regime to have high compliance but
less universal ratification.
Reality, of course, occurs somewhere in between these
extremes. Human rights treaties often have substantial formal
monitoring requirements that are set off by limitations on their
enforcement in the form of behavior that will satisfy the treaty's
standards or exempt a State from compliance. 41 Assuming the goal of
the process would be to gain as much compliance from as many States
as possible, we would suggest a regime design that balances all of
these concerns. As a threshold matter, monitoring in all cases must be
strong because without monitoring one would expect minimal
compliance. The most effective regime design would provide for
specific, individually negotiated benchmarks for each country.142
141. For

normative

analysis, see

Ryan Goodman,

Human Rights

Treaties, Invalid

Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 531 (2002); for examples, see citations infra
note 151.

142. A variation on this first model would be the use of framework conventions that allowed
nations to agree to the general desirability of a goal with negotiated standards to occur at a later
time. Such a regime may allow for the certainty of the norm to be established and increased as
more nations commit to and implement it-building increased pressure on the esteem function of
other nations that are later to commit. One example of this type of convention is the European
Union's directive prohibiting employment discrimination, the Council of Europe Directive
Establishing a Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation. Council
Directive 2000/78, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC). The European Union elected not to define
"disability" on the ground that member States would define the term within their particular
legal and cultural contexts. This in turn creates an incentive for a definition that is believed not to
violate the umbrella directive. See Lisa Waddington, Implementing the Disability Provisionsof the
Framework Employment Directive: Room for Exercising National Discretion, in
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Objectively verifiable standards, of course, would help increase the
efficacy of monitoring. Such a regime would yield the largest number
of ratifying States while also ensuring, to the extent possible, the
highest standards of compliance for each country relevant to their
desire for esteem.
To synthesize our analysis we provide a model of how the above
insights on treaty design and monitoring may affect the
implementation of the forthcoming United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This treaty is expected to be
adopted by the 61 st General Assembly. 143 As of this writing, several
provisions remain subject to negotiation, the most crucial of which
focuses on the standards and mechanisms for implementing the
144
treaty.
To address the manner of the convention's implementation, a
committee of National Human Rights Institutions ("NHRIs" are quasijudicial bodies that implement human rights at the domestic level)
submitted a draft proposal. 145 The NHRI submission contains
innovative mechanisms directed at ensuring compliance. Most notable
are the creation (in conjunction with disabled persons organizations)
of baseline measurements and the drafting of individual national level
action plans against which to assess progress, collective complaint
mechanisms, and regional implementation. 146 Taken together, the
proposed NHRI measures ensure transparent and efficient monitoring
of the human rights of disabled persons. Although the adoption of all
or part of this proposal is not guaranteed, its content is clearly
147
illustrative of the reputational mechanism we model in this Article.

RIGHTS IN EUROPE: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 107, 109 (Anna Lawson & Caroline Gooding eds.,

2005) ("EC directives set goals which Member States are obliged to achieve within a given
period, but leave Member States free to select the most appropriate means of achieving those
goals.").
143. Information on the treaty is available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable. For an
analysis by one of the participants, see Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
144. See Letter from the Chairman to all Members of the Committee (Oct. 7, 2005), available
at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahcchairletter7oct.htm.
145. Towards An Innovative Monitoring Mechanism for the Convention: Submission on
Behalf of National Human Rights Institutions to the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on a
Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (August 2005) [hereinafter NHRI Submission];
availableat http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/documents/ihrcse.doc.
146. Id. A conference was recently convened to discuss and refine the initial proposal. See
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/2005/12/02_disabilities.php.
147. Parenthetically, we note that current attempts at overhauling the United Nations
treaty enforcement system are likewise harmonious with our framework. See The SecretaryGeneral, Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change: Report of the
Secretary General: Corrigendum, U.N. Doc. A/57/387 (Oct. 16, 2002) (calling for measures aimed
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The most effective way of using the pull of international society
to leverage States into human rights compliance is through the
creation of objectively-verifiable provisions that reflect realistic,
realizable goals for each individual state member of the treaty
regime. 148 The proposed NHRI model creates baseline measures and
National Action Plans that are individual to every State party, and
would be developed in conjunction with their administrative agencies,
judiciaries, National Human Rights Institutions, and involved
organizations). 149
persons
disabled
(mainly,
stakeholders
Consequently, the monitoring of a disability human rights convention
would be transparent: a treaty body would measure a State's progress
against the baselines and aspirations that a State had agreed-upon.
Claims that a state could not realize such individually tailored goals
will be less credible given the process by which the goals were created.
Moreover, the use of regional assessments provides added incentive
for a given State to comply with the convention to at least a level
equal to that of its geo-political neighbors. 150 In sum, this form of
monitoring puts into place documents that enable the questioning and
enforcement of a State's commitment by specifically delineating the
progress that must be achieved to maintain that State's reputational
benefit. Even if that State argues that economic circumstances have
changed since ratification such that compliance has been made more
difficult, this system still constitutes a vast improvement over the
laudable but vague aspirations contained in current treaties.
Having provided a model of how expressive forces can best be
used for achieving ratification and compliance, let us now turn to one
or two further implications of the theory before providing our example
of how the theory will be operationalized. One of the major
implications of expressive theory for international law hinges on the
important notion that group identity and attraction matters. There
are at least two observations that flow from this understanding. First,
for human rights treaties to succeed fully, States must be involved in
other meaningful cooperative relationships. Without trade and other
interaction, States will not develop the attraction to the group that

at increasing coordination among monitoring bodies, greater standardization of reporting
requirements, and additional monitoring at the national level).
148. This is a commonly held assertion. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, Compliance with the
Law: Problems and Prospects,in EFFECTING COMPLIANCE 162 (Hazel Fox & Michael Meyer eds.
2000) (transparent monitoring mechanisms necessary to effectuate regime compliance);
Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance, and InternationalLaw: Reflections on the United
Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 37-46 (1991) (positing that only an effective
enforcement mechanism can alter regime behavior).
149. See NHRI Submission, supra note 145.
150. Id.
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results from the operation of the need-reinforcement principle. In this
sense, strategies to protect human rights must be drawn much more
broadly than simply within the context of human rights institutions.
Aggressive pursuit of cooperation with States must be considered a
part of any effective human rights protection scheme, at least to the
extent such a scheme relies on normative forces for its success.
Second, failure to identify with a group can lead States to
esteem behaviors that are contrary to international norms. The rebel
phenomenon is well known. Rebels identify not with the main group
but with a group of "outsiders;" indeed, rebels in some measure define
their identities by the amount they contravene established norms.
Accordingly, rebels smoke, drive quickly and recklessly, or ride their
motorcycles without helmets to flaunt the norms of the majority.
States that act as rebels get esteem from a group other than the
majority and thus get utility from not following a norm. International
lawmakers must be wary of this phenomenon and factor it into their
regime design. Creating broad, well-designed regimes will positively
impact in-group members but will spur decreased compliance from
self-defined rebels. In its broadest sense, this idea parallels the
argument above that the most effective course for compliance is
building group allegiance, but it is important to recognize that regimes
are not universal. Thus, a true measure of a treaty's effectiveness will
not simply be the compliance it engenders within the group but also
the decreased compliance of those outside the regime.

F. Making Human Rights Treaties Matter
In an influential article, Oona Hathaway analyzes substantial
empirical data and concludes that, in certain cases, States entering
human rights treaties actually increase their violations of treaty
standards after joining.1 5 ' Hathaway's conclusion raises concerns
about the efficacy of human rights treaties specifically, and also
throws into relief general concerns regarding the ability of social
forces to influence compliance.
Hathaway provides an explanation for these results that is
grounded in expressive theory. She suggests that States behave in this
manner in order to receive the reputational benefit that comes from
joining treaty regimes without having to bear related compliance
costs. Both Hathaway's empirical methodology and her theoretical
model have been criticized. 15 2 Some commentators, for example, take
issue with Hathaway's reliance on observed abuses. They note that,
151. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 1940.
152. See citations supra note 6.
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because monitoring increases once a treaty has been ratified, the
number of observed treaty violations will also increase, in which case
ratification correlates with greater knowledge of existing abuses
rather than with greater abuses. 153 A core assumption of her theorythat failure to comply does not carry reputational effects-also raises
expressive law concerns. Hathway's critics argue that reputational
benefits decrease as a State is revealed to be out of compliance with
treaty terms. Thus, they point out that, a claim that reputational
factors can create incentives to enter into a human rights treaty
without also intending to comply with its mandates, is misplaced. 154
The lack of a full theory of expressive international law,
however, has rendered impracticable further discussion of this
reputational explanation. Without a comprehensive theory one cannot
begin to consider whether Hathaway's empirical findings are simply
incorrect or, if they are correct, whether they reflect poor treaty design
or the inability of social forces to influence the behavior of States. Our
expressive theory picks up this challenge and provides insights into
Hathaway's arguments. It agrees that, if monitoring is as low or nonexistent as she claims, many States motivated by reputation will
ratify treaties without complying afterwards. It also provides an
understanding of when the backsliding Hathaway identifies may
occur. Ultimately, the expressive theory provides reasons for
questioning Hathaway's empiricism. It also clearly suggests that, to
the extent existing treaties are not effective, this shortcoming is the
result of their ineffective design, and not proof that social forces
cannot influence State behavior.
Hathaway's expressive explanation of her data can be
described by syllogism. First, she argues, States ratify treaties for
expressive purposes that function like a roll call vote in Congress. As
she explains it, ratification is a "pleasing statement not necessarily
intended to have any real effect on outcomes. It declares to the world
that the principles outlined in the treaty are consistent with the
ratifying government's commitment to human rights."15 5 Second, she
argues that when monitoring and enforcement are minimal, a
disjuncture may arise between the expressive and instrumental roles
of treaties. 156 Hathaway concludes that in instances of disjuncture,
153. Goodman & Jinks, Measuring the Effects, supra note 6, at 174-76 (stating that
Hathaway's model cannot distinguish between a State in which levels of torture increase post
ratification and a State in which torture declines post ratification but appears to increase
because liberalization eases the process of documenting and reporting instances of torture).
154. Id. at 179-80 (describing the paradox that to be meaningful the signal must be costly yet
at the same time States will choose to ratify if the ratification signal is relatively costless).
155. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 2005-06.
156. Id. at 2006.
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treaties' expressive aspects can "relieve pressure for real change in
performance in countries that ratify the treaty," because these
instruments "offer rewards for positions rather than for effects."' 157 A
corollary to this main argument flows from her observation that
regional treaties are more likely to create conditions for backsliding
than universal ones. She concludes that this dynamic results from
even greater pressure for States to join treaties when those treaties
158
concern other States with whom they share strong regional ties.
Our theory suggests that Hathaway's analysis may be right in
very specific situations where States are certain that failure to comply
will be of no consequence, and a strong international norm existed
before a treaty regime developed. Consider, for example, a State before
the creation of a treaty limiting torture of prisoners. Assume that
before the treaty, a well-known norm exists against this practice.
Concerns for esteem would lead the State to signal by behaving a
certain way-in this case, not torturing prisoners. Treaty ratification,
however, may serve to replace actual behavior as a way of signaling
commitment to international society. When that circumstance occurs,
the need to act to signal is decreased, and one would expect a State to
adjust its behavior accordingly.
Hathaway's theory works, however, only in cases where a State
can act in derogation of a treaty without serious consequence to its
reputation. For example, in situations where the State can plausibly
argue that it is progressively addressing the treaty's stated goals or
where its acts will not be discovered. In these circumstances, the
benefits of esteem received from ratification must be balanced against
the loss that comes from compliance failure. Where the net loss
between these two is greater than the esteem received before entering
into the treaty, the State will backslide. Note, however, how quickly
the reputational effects assert themselves when monitoring cannot be
discounted or where the standards in the treaty create objective and
empirically verifiable standards of conduct through domestic action
plans. In that case, failure to abide by the treaty not only carries
reputational impacts because the State cannot as easily ambiguate the
message carried by its behavior, but now the State will also be seen as
violating another (more global) norm-the norm of respecting and
keeping one's obligations. In such cases, it is highly unlikely that
backsliding would occur.
Expressive theory thus explains that backsliding may occur in
certain cases. We take issue with Hathaway, however, over how
prevalent such situations are, and we disagree with her to the extent
157. Id. at 2007 (internal citations omitted).
158. Id. at 2016.
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that she claims failure to comply with most treaties would have little
or no reputational effect. In particular, we agree with Hathaway that
self-monitoring by States of their own compliance with human rights
treaties leaves much to be desired. 15 9 We disagree, however, with her
exclusive focus on "woefully inadequate" State-driven compliance
mechanisms when examining the crucial issue of monitoring. In
pointing out this inadequacy, Hathaway concludes that "the failure of
a country to comply with its treaty obligations is, in most cases,
unlikely to be revealed and examined except by already overtaxed
NGOs."'160 Yet it is precisely NGOs, even when over-taxed, that exist
to identify and report human rights violations. Moreover, the
dissemination of this information, and the reputational affects that it
conveys, leverage States to alter their behavior in order to avoid losing
6
the esteem of the global community.' '
Our expressive theory provides robust support for this
understanding. Every behavior provides a signal to the extent a State
will infer the group commitment of the signaling State from it. While
signals of group commitment communicated through compliance can
be ambiguated, the notion that failure to comply carries with it little
or no reputational effect is seriously circumspect. We would, in
particular, take issue with claims that all or most States can plausibly
deny their commitment to treaties over a period of time. This is
especially true in relation to the previously discussed notion of
progressive realization. As States develop economically over time, the
ability to explain away a consistent level of non-compliance becomes
more difficult. One would thus expect that developing nations would
decrease their violations over time, and that developed nations would
be unable to explain away many violations. In consequence, further
inquiry needs to be made both into Hathaway's empirical
methodology, and into its normative implications.

159. Hathaway argues that this type of monitoring is "woefully inadequate." Id. at 2008. See
also PETER UVIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT 140 (2004) (finding that monitoring
processes "constitute some of the most powerless, under-funded, formulaic, and politically
manipulated institutions of the United Nations"). We note, parenthetically, that the current
United Nations treaty monitoring system is undergoing reform.
160. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties, supra note 5, at 2008 (internal citations
omitted).
161. Moreover, the United States State Department also compiles information on national
human rights that it publishes annually. An electronic archive of Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices compiled prior to 2001 is available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/
human-rights/hrp-reports-mainhp.html. The irony, then, of Hathaway's claims is that although
she describes the difficulty of gathering information on human rights compliance she herself has
gathered the information in a manner that allows her to measure compliance in a detailed and
complex manner.
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CONCLUSION

This Article provides an initial and comprehensive
understanding of the forces behind human rights treaty creation and
compliance by drawing on evolving expressive law literature. It began
by setting forth a model that explained how normative pressure
influences rational actors to alter their behavior and beliefs while
seeking regard from other group members. Next, the Article applied
the model to State treaty ratification and compliance, and argued that
the powerful pull of international society creates a rational choice for
States to abide by these instruments because of their desire to be part
of, and esteemed by, the global community. It demonstrated how
international process influenced States' preferences and normative
beliefs, which in turn affected their willingness to ratify and comply
with treaties. The Article also demonstrated how expressive theory
harmonizes the valuable (but incomplete) contributions of divergent
international law scholars into a more comprehensive theory of why
States enter into and honor international agreements. In doing so, it
presented
a
detailed
framework
from
which
predictable
determinations can be drawn. Finally, the expressive framework was
used to describe the means for harnessing the "pull of international
society" in the specific context of a disability human rights treaty that
one of the authors is drafting and which will soon be presented to the
United Nations General Assembly.
Identifying how the desire for esteem from the global
community motivates States to comply with international law has
eluded scholars since the time of Grotius. The current debate among
international legal scholars focuses on the efficacy of a reputational
mechanism to impel State compliance with human rights treaties. The
resulting literature is an important body of work that recognizes the
centrality and implications of esteem-based mechanisms on
compliance, but fails to provide a level of detail necessary to
understand or predict how the desire for esteem affects the behavior of
States. This Article has addressed that lacuna by presenting a
comprehensive and detailed expressive law framework. In doing so, it
provided an avenue for continued (and more focused) discussion and
debate over how the desire for esteem influences States to enter into and
comply with human rights treaties.
It is imperative that we understand the impact that the pull of
international society exerts over State behavior. The United Nations
is currently undergoing a systematic reassessment, with special
emphasis on the structure and efficacy of its treaty system. Dramatic
changes are being proposed, including the combination of all existing
treaty commissions (including the proposed disability-related one) into
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a single super-treaty monitoring body. The final (structural)
configuration of the United Nations treaty system, however, is less
significant for influencing human rights compliance and regime
change than is the efficacy of its monitoring processes. Transparent
and efficient implementation of individually crafted and objectively
verifiable standards must be created if States' need for international
esteem is to be leveraged towards human rights treaty ratification and
compliance. Expressive principles supply the means to harness the
pull of international society and make treaty ratification and
compliance effective.

